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Article 1

ARTICLES

Smoking Out the Impact of
Tobacco-Related Decisions on
Public Health Law
Micah L. Berman†
Tobacco is a product—and public health problem—
unlike any other. No other legal consumable product is nearly
as addictive or as deadly as the cigarette, which kills
approximately 440,000 Americans every year.1 Moreover,
tobacco products have exerted an unparalleled influence over
American society and culture. As Allan Brandt wrote in The
Cigarette Century, cigarettes have “deeply penetrated
American culture,” leaving “few, if any, central aspects of
American society that are truly smoke-free.”2 These and other
characteristics make tobacco use a highly unusual public
health issue, and therefore courts have often distorted
precedents and shaped their decisions to accommodate the
unique exigencies of tobacco-related cases. In turn, these
decisions have significantly reshaped public health law
doctrine, affecting a wide variety of health-related concerns
outside the tobacco context.

†

Assistant Professor, New England Law | Boston. An earlier version of this
Article was presented at the 2008 Health Law Scholars Workshop at St. Louis
University School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the workshop, especially
Sidney Watson, Scott Burris, Rob Gatter, and Tim Greaney. Additional thanks to
Elizabeth Leonard, Maggie Mahoney, Elizabeth Bloom, Lawrence Friedman, and the
faculty of New England Law | Boston.
1
Rob Crane, The Most Addictive Drug, the Most Deadly Substance: Smoking
Cessation Tactics for the Busy Clinician, 34 PRIMARY CARE CLINICAL OFF. PRAC. 117,
117 (2007) (“By several measures, nicotine is the world’s most highly addictive drug,
and tobacco is its most deadly substance.”).
2
ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 3 (2007).

1

2

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

This Article seeks to uncover and analyze the role that
tobacco-related litigation has played in the evolution of public
health law doctrine. “Public health law” can be described as the
application of administrative and tort law to the field of public
health, subject to the limitations imposed by constitutional
law.3 The past twenty-five years have seen substantial shifts in
both the administrative and tort law aspects of public health
law. In administrative law, the Supreme Court has “gradually
erod[ed] the deference accorded to administrative agencies,”
including public health entities.4 This retreat from the highly
deferential rule announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.5 has had profound implications
for the ability of regulatory agencies to proactively address
public health challenges. At the same time, federal court
decisions in personal injury and products liability cases have
made it substantially more difficult for public health advocates
to use tort law in ways that “influence and develop . . . policies
directly affecting the public’s health.”6
What role have tobacco-related cases played in these
developments? Have these cases pushed public health law in
particular directions? Or have tobacco-related decisions merely
reflected broader cross-cutting trends? This Article suggests
that while there have certainly been other factors concurrently
driving the development of public health law, a broader
perspective reveals that tobacco cases have had a considerable
influence that has been generally unrecognized. In several
different areas, doctrines developed or extended in tobaccorelated cases have engrained an anti-regulatory bias into
3

See generally Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative
Law: Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 61 (2007); Elizabeth A. Weeks,
Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 27 (2007); Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health and Constitutional Law: Recognizing
the Relationship, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 13 (2007). This Article will not explore
the constitutional law aspects of public health law, though tobacco-related cases have
played a substantial role in that field as well. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001) (exploring First Amendment limitations on the regulation of
commercial speech).
4
Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?): Justice
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 1, 42-43 (2007) (suggesting that Justice Alito’s elevation to the Supreme Court
created a modest shift back towards a more deferential view of agency decisions in the
2006 Term).
5
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6
Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of
Affirmative Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1663,
1669 (1999).
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public health law, and this has made it more difficult for
plaintiffs seeking redress for other types of health-related
injuries to have their cases heard in court. Overall, if it had not
been for tobacco-related cases, today’s health-related litigation
would likely encounter a markedly different legal landscape.
Reconsidering the history of tobacco-related cases is important
for understanding the dynamics of public health law’s evolution
and the ways in which public health goals can (or cannot) be
pursued through regulation and litigation. This, in turn, raises
questions for legal scholars, judges, and public health experts
alike as to how tobacco-related cases should be treated by the
courts.
Part I of this Article discusses whether tobacco cases are
“exceptional,” and suggests several reasons why courts have
approached smoking-related litigation differently from other
public health cases. Part II reviews the impact of tobacco cases
in the regulatory context, focusing on the wide-ranging impact
of the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.7 There, the Court rejected the FDA’s jurisdiction
over tobacco products, after struggling with what it termed
tobacco’s “unique place in American history and society.”8 In
the process of reaching this conclusion, the Court collapsed the
two-part Chevron test into a one-step process that provided far
less deference for administrative action. The impact of this
decision has reached far beyond tobacco cases, limiting the
ability of other regulatory agencies to addresses emerging
public health concerns. Part III assesses the influence of
tobacco cases on personal injury litigation and products
liability lawsuits. This Part covers three primary subjects:
preemption, class certification, and punitive damages. Part IV
concludes the Article by raising the normative question of how
the courts should have approached tobacco-related cases, and
suggests that the courts’ failure to directly confront this
question has allowed tobacco litigation to have a distorting
impact on the rest of public health law.
I.

IS TOBACCO EXCEPTIONAL?

As an initial matter, it may be necessary to explore the
concept of uniqueness and disentangle two meanings of the

7
8

529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Id. at 159-60.
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word “exceptionalism.” In various fields of law, scholars have
argued that if a particular subject is “exceptional,” it must be
subjected to a unique set of legal rules because the existing
legal framework cannot accommodate it. For example, claims
have been made that distinct legal structures (whether
statutory or judicially developed) are needed to address modern
phenomena
such
as
the
Internet,
genomics,
and
nanotechnology.9 In the context of public health, Ronald Bayer
argued in 1991 that despite the existence of a legal framework
for combating communicable diseases, “HIV exceptionalism”
had produced a unique set of laws to deal with the AIDS
epidemic.10
This Article will not explore that type of exceptionalism,
i.e., whether a different legal framework is necessary to
address the issue of tobacco. Tobacco products do have their
own regulatory regime, which is clearly “exceptional” in the
world of food and drug law.11 Though warning labels are
required on cigarette packages by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), “[c]igarettes have been
specifically exempted from coverage under the Fair Labeling
and Packaging Act of 1966, the Controlled Substances Act of
9

See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (arguing that the “law of cyberspace”
should be considered a distinct and specialized area of law); Lainie Friedman Ross,
Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
141 (2001) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the arguments in favor of “genetic
exceptionalism”); Frederick A. Fielder & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593 (1994) (“Some of the
problems posed by nanotechnology may be sui generis . . . and may therefore be
addressable only through the creation of entirely new rules.”).
10
Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to
HIV Exceptionalism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991) (“[I]n the end, it was
those who called for ‘HIV exceptionalism’ who came to dominate the public discourse.”).
Scott Burris later responded that the response to HIV was better viewed as a typical
response to a new public health threat. Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS
Exceptionalism,” and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251, 261 (1994) (“in other
words, unique but not exceptional”).
11
After years of inaction, Congress recently passed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which for the first time grants the FDA limited
authority to regulate cigarettes. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009); see also
Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at
A15. This 83-page law sets out an intricate and unique set of regulatory provisions that
will govern the tobacco industry. The FDA’s authority over tobacco products is limited
in several respects. Most notably, the FDA is prohibited from “(A) banning all
cigarettes, all smokeless tobacco products, all little cigars, all cigars other than little
cigars, all pipe tobacco, or all roll-your-own tobacco products; or (B) requiring the
reduction of nicotine yields of a tobacco product to zero.” H.R. 1256, 111th Cong.
§ 907(d)(3) (2009). The law also specifically states that it should not be read to
“establish a precedent with regard to any other industry.” Id. § 4(a)(1).
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1970, the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (establishing
the Consumer Product Safety Commission), and the Toxic
Substances Act of 1976.”12 That Congress has chosen to regulate
(or not regulate) tobacco differently from other public health
concerns has certainly had implications for tobacco-related
litigation, as discussed below. But whether such unique
treatment by Congress is itself warranted or unwarranted is a
policy debate beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, this Article suggests that tobacco cases are
treated in an “exceptional” manner by the courts, and that such
treatment has had a distorting effect on judicial decisionmaking in the field of public health. Courts purport to apply
the same legal doctrine to tobacco cases that they apply to all
other public health issues, and they do so in a facially neutral
way. In actuality, however, courts tend to be unusually
skeptical of attempts to regulate tobacco and of plaintiffs’
claims against the tobacco industry. Because tobacco-related
cases then stand as precedent for other public health cases,
this legal “exceptionalism” exerts a significant influence on the
overall direction of public health law.
By analogy, scholars have noted a similar phenomenon
in the field of criminal procedure, where courts purport to
apply the Fourth Amendment in a facially neutral way, but
seem to operate with less concern for privacy interests when
illegal drugs are involved.13 Limiting Fourth Amendment rights
in drug cases then has a distorting impact on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence more generally, leading to
weakened privacy protections for defendants even when illegal
drugs are not involved. Although there are surely other factors
beyond the “war on drugs” that have led the Supreme Court
towards a more pro-prosecution posture in Fourth Amendment
cases, scholars have persuasively argued that the unique
exigencies of drug cases have played a significant role in
shaping the law.

12

Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy
Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 769, 774 (1999).
13
Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 766-72 (2002)
(suggesting as possible explanations for this phenomenon the “sheer magnitude of drug
crime and enforcement activities” and the “substantial personal and professional
pressures of any given judge” to support the government’s efforts to combat illegal
drugs); see also Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 926 (1987) (predicting that dangerous precedents
developed in drug prosecutions would inevitably “spill over to other areas of law”).
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Similarly, as discussed below, courts purport to apply
existing legal doctrine to tobacco cases, but the results in key
cases have departed from prior precedent in significant ways.
Just as illegal drug cases have played a prominent role in
reshaping Fourth Amendment doctrine, tobacco cases have
facilitated or furthered broader changes in the contours of
public health law doctrine for all future cases—even when
tobacco is not involved.
But what is it about tobacco cases that causes courts to
approach these cases differently? Though this is by no means
an exhaustive list, tobacco’s unique history, the volume of
tobacco litigation, and the saliency of the cultural and economic
issues involved have all been significant factors.
A.

History and Entrenchment in Society

Although many people assume that cigarettes have been
popular for centuries, it was not until the early Twentieth
Century that the cigarette rolling machine was invented,
allowing tobacco companies to mass produce and mass market
cigarettes. Cigarettes soon became hugely popular, helped in
part by the distribution of free cigarettes to U.S. soldiers in
World War II.14 By the early 1950s, when the first credible
reports of the link between smoking and cancer were published
in medical journals, “[n]early one out of two Americans could be
counted as a regular smoker.”15
The rapid growth of the industry was impressive, but it
was the industry’s response to revelations of the cigarette’s
dangers that set its history on a unique course. Instead of
removing the product from the market or providing explicit
warnings to consumers, the tobacco companies chose a third
option—a cover-up. With the help of a public relations firm,
Hill & Knowlton, the industry began its fifty-year campaign to
deceive the public about the health effects of smoking.16 As

14

Deb Reichmann, Military Encounters Resistance to Proposed Ban on
Smoking, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2009, at 4 (“Soldiers got cigarettes in their Crations during World War II.”).
15
Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 855 (1992) [hereinafter Rabin, Sociolegal History].
16
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1483-87 (1999)
(summarizing Hill & Knowlton’s involvement in the “extraordinary decades-long
campaign of the [cigarette] industry, acting in concert, to foster and perpetuate
‘controversy’ over whether cigarettes cause disease”).
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Judge Kessler summarized in United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc.:
From at least 1953 until at least 2000, [the cigarette manufacturers]
repeatedly, consistently, vigorously—and falsely—denied the
existence of any adverse health effects from smoking. Moreover, they
mounted a coordinated, well-financed, sophisticated public relations
campaign to attack and distort the scientific evidence demonstrating
the relationship between smoking and disease, claiming that the link
between the two was still an “open question.” Finally, in doing so,
they ignored the massive documentation in their internal corporate
files from their own scientists, executives, and public relations
people that, as Philip Morris’s Vice President of Research and
Development, Helmut Wakeham, admitted, there was “little basis
for disputing the findings [of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report
concluding that smoking causes lung cancer].”17

Although manufacturers of other products have delayed
reporting known dangers of their products, the scope and
duration of the tobacco industry’s campaign of deception stands
alone. The success of this fraudulent campaign had substantial
legal implications, as the tobacco companies were able to
successfully argue in court for decades that cigarettes did not
cause cancer (or, in each specific case, that cigarettes had not
caused the plaintiff’s cancer).18 By the time that defense was no
longer tenable, the tobacco companies were able to pivot—
amazingly, without conceding the connection between smoking
and disease—to the defense that the plaintiff’s own decision to
smoke (in light of the “common knowledge” that smoking
causes disease) should absolve the companies of any
responsibility.19
The tobacco companies, however, were not able to fully
escape legal liability. Most notably, the tobacco companies
signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998,
committing themselves to paying more than $200 billion to
state governments.20 Although the MSA (and the avalanche of
document disclosures that both preceded and followed the
17

United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 208 (D.D.C.
2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
18
See infra Part III.B.
19
At times, the industry attempted to assert these two arguments
simultaneously: “Its lawyers and executives would deny that there was any proof that
cigarettes caused cancer. At the same time, they maintained that anyone . . . who chose
to smoke assumed the risk of getting such a disease.” MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE
RISK 49 (1999).
20
Master Settlement Agreement 1-2, 44-45 (1998), available at
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/.
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agreement) wounded the tobacco industry’s reputation, it
permitted the industry to continue operating and it provided a
measure of immunity from state-initiated lawsuits. It also
provided some amount of protection from private lawsuits, as
the industry was later able to argue in court that the MSA had
forced it to fully account for its past misdeeds and reform its
conduct.21
Looking at this history as a whole, the continued
existence of tobacco in the marketplace can be seen as a
historical accident. As Thomas Merrill has written, “If
cigarettes were introduced today, knowing what we know about
them as a product, there is little doubt that they would be
banned.”22 (This is in contrast to other public health concerns
such as firearms and alcohol, where the risk/benefit trade-off
has been more or less apparent for centuries.) However,
because the cigarette became so deeply engrained in American
society before its dangers were acknowledged—and because
roughly 45 million Americans remain addicted to cigarettes—
prohibition is not seen as an attractive or realistic policy
option.23 Thus, tobacco remains a legal product, but one that
poses unique challenges for the courts and public health
regulators because of its entrenchment in society and the
massive number of people addicted to this highly dangerous
product.
B.

Volume of Litigation

Both the scope of the devastation caused by tobacco
products and the profitability of the industry made it a
uniquely appealing target for plaintiffs’ attorneys. In addition,
the fact that tobacco products, despite their enormous death
21

See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 55051, 553-54 (Ga. 2006) (holding that private plaintiffs could not seek punitive damages
from Brown & Williamson because the MSA had vindicated the state’s interest in
punishing the tobacco companies). Provisions which would have explicitly limited the
tobacco companies’ liability were included in earlier versions of the agreement, but not
the final draft of the MSA.
22
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting,
Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143,
1203 (1999).
23
See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian
Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 435 (2000) (“While various contemporary
leaders . . . have denounced tobacco as a leading killer of Americans, there has been no
call from the White House or Congress to ban the product.”). For an argument in favor
of gradually phasing out cigarettes, see Richard A. Daynard, Doing the Unthinkable
(and Saving Millions of Lives), 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 2 (2009).
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toll, were uniquely unregulated, led public health advocates to
turn to the courts as an alternative channel through which to
impose limits on the industry.24 In some cases, the goal was
compensation for injured clients, while in others, plaintiffs’
attorneys sought to use litigation to “get [the tobacco
companies] out of business.”25
These efforts by plaintiffs’ attorneys confronted a
“scorched earth” litigation strategy by the tobacco industry that
was “unique in the annals of tort litigation.”26 As Sara Guardino
and Richard Daynard write, “The industry’s success in the
litigation [was] primarily because at the outset a decision was
made to fight the lawsuits all out, never considering settlement
in even the smallest sum.”27 This strategy set the industry
apart from most other defendants:
[I]n mass tort litigation—that is, litigation involving a huge number
of claims arising out of a single hazardous course of conduct or event,
such as the asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and DES cases—there has
always come a point when the beleaguered defense has decided that
at least some of the persistently arising claims are worth settling. By
contrast, over a period of thirty-five years, the tobacco industry
never offered to settle a single case.28

The collision of aggressive litigation against the tobacco
industry and the no-compromise strategy adopted by the
defendants has meant that more smoking-related cases have
been (and will continue to be) brought to trial, in comparison to
cases dealing with other public health concerns. This is
especially true given the length of time that cigarettes have
been on the market and the millions of Americans with
potential legal claims. Compare, for example, the recent
litigation over Merck’s pain reliever Vioxx. When it became
clear that there was a connection between Vioxx use and heart
attacks, Merck was hit with a flood of thousands of lawsuits.
After litigating fewer than twenty cases to trial, Merck agreed
24

See BRANDT, supra note 2, at 439 (“Attempts to regulate the tobacco
industry had usually—when they yielded any results at all—ended in legislation that
protected the industry from regulation. The resort to litigation grew out of these longstanding failures of political and regulatory efforts.”).
25
See, e.g., CBS This Morning: Florida Lawyer Launches Attack on Several
Major Tobacco Companies (CBS television broadcast Aug. 26, 1996) (interviewing
plaintiffs’ attorney Stanley Rosenblatt).
26
Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857.
27
Sara D. Guardino & Richard Daynard, Punishing Tobacco Industry
Misconduct: The Case for Exceeding a Single Digit Ratio Between Punitive and
Compensatory Damages, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005).
28
Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857-58.
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to a massive $4.85 billion settlement that resolved more than
26,000 claims at once.29 As Merck no longer sells Vioxx, having
withdrawn it from the market in 2004,30 the settlement seems
to have effectively ended litigation over the drug. The decision
to settle was thus a logical business calculation, despite the
existence of viable defenses. By contrast, Cliff Douglas et al.
report that at least seventy-five smoking-related cases were
tried to a verdict between 1995 and 2005, while nearly 3000
individual actions are still pending.31 Since cigarettes, unlike
Vioxx, remain on the market, and since there are literally
millions of plaintiffs who could have similar claims, the tobacco
companies are strongly predisposed against settling or
conceding liability in any of these cases (which is, similarly, a
logical business decision). The trajectory of the Vioxx
litigation—a short-term outburst of cases followed by
settlement of most claims—appears to be the more common
pattern for public-health related claims. Yet it is the steady
flow of tobacco-related cases that continues to produce more
trials, more appeals, and ultimately more case law.32
This high volume of litigation is a direct result of the
uniqueness of tobacco as a product. Whereas other dangerous
products have been either banned by regulators (lead paint,
DDT, thalidomide) or litigated out of business (asbestos),
29

Vioxx
Settlement
Agreement
1-2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_Agreement.pdf; Press Release,
Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Agreement to Resolve U.S. VIOXX Product Liability Lawsuits
(Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/
2007_1109_print.html.
30
Marc Kaufman, Merck Withdraws Arthritis Medication, WASH. POST., Oct.
1, 2004, at A1.
31
Clifford E. Douglas et al., Epidemiology of the Third Wave of Tobacco
Litigation in the United States, 1994-2005, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL (Supp. IV) iv9, iv1112 (2006). Thousands more individual cases have since been filed in Florida, following
the decertification of the Engle v. Liggette Group, Inc. class action. Stephen Hudak,
Smokers Crowd Court to Sue Big Tobacco, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2008, at A1
(citing projections that as many as 10,000 individuals may file individual lawsuits). In
Engle, the Florida Supreme Court decertified a massive smoking-related class action
following a jury verdict for the plaintiff class. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d
1256, 1268 (Fla. 2006); see also infra text accompanying note 194. In decertifying the
class, the Florida Supreme Court held that factual findings made by the Engle jury
would be given res judicata effect in future individual lawsuits. Engle, 945 So. 2d at
1269.
32
The tobacco industry’s pattern of appealing each adverse verdict until it
receives a more favorable ruling has resulted in more precedential law being
established in the context of tobacco claims, with the vast majority of these cases
leaning in industry’s direction. Douglas et al. found that that of the thirty-one jury
verdicts that plaintiffs won in litigation against tobacco companies between 1995 and
2005, all of them were appealed. In only three cases was the initial jury verdict upheld
and the defendant ordered to pay the plaintiff. Douglas, supra note 31, at iv12 tbl. 2.
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tobacco remains on the market despite its status as the leading
cause of preventable death. With some dangerous products,
such as firearms, Congress has made the policy decision to
prohibit most litigation against the industry.33 But with
Congress unwilling to either ban tobacco litigation or ban the
product, the steady drumbeat of tobacco litigation is set to
continue indefinitely.34
C.

Cultural & Economic Significance

Although cultural and economic pressures frame the
background in all legal proceedings, these pressures have been
particularly acute in the case of tobacco litigation. At the time
the first medical studies linking smoking to cancer emerged in
the mid-1950s, “cigarette smoking rivaled baseball as
America’s national pastime.”35 “The cigarette was a cultural
icon in Western society—tobacco smoking was viewed as chic,
promoted ubiquitously, and portrayed by sports and movie
stars as an accoutrement of the good life.”36 Although the allure
of smoking gradually declined as the health effects of smoking
were revealed, the industry has worked hard to maintain the
cigarette’s status as a cultural icon, spending more than $15
billion a year in advertising in the U.S. alone.37
Perhaps due in part to this unique history, tobacco
litigation has sparked intense debate—both inside and outside
the courtroom—about the role of government in regulating
individual conduct. Tobacco lawsuits have become the stage for
33

See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79017903 (2006) (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, “a civil action or proceeding or an
administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of
[firearms or ammunition], or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages,
injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other
relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm or ammunition] by
the person or a third party”).
34
It has yet to be seen whether Congress’s recent enactment of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act will at all alter this dynamic. The law
does not ban tobacco products, see supra note 11, nor does it bar further litigation
against the tobacco industry. See, e.g., H.R. 1256, 111th Cong. § 916(b) (2009) (“No
provision of this chapter relating to a tobacco product shall be construed to modify or
otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under the product liability law
of any State.”).
35
Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation
in the United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2001).
36
Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Regulatory Strategies for Tobacco Control, 298
J. AM. MED. ASSN. 2057, 2057 (2007).
37
JUDITH MACKAY ET AL., THE TOBACCO ATLAS 60 (2d ed. 2006).
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“morality play[s], with judges and juries responsible for
scripting which party is most deserving of blame.”38 The tobacco
industry has worked to “reframe[] tobacco from a public health
problem to an issue of individual choice . . . tap[ping] into
American ideals of individual freedom, and in turn portray[ing]
public health advocates as extremists who support government
intrusion into private decision making.”39 These efforts have
made tobacco litigation a socially contentious issue, as much
about preserving “free choice and personal responsibility” as
about the industry’s misconduct.40
Although issues of personal choice and individual
responsibility are central to many public health threats (drug
addiction, sexually transmitted disease, etc.), only tobacco
litigation has seen this subject intensely litigated in the
courtroom.41 Some have suggested that food-related litigation,
which clearly implicates the issue of personal responsibility, is
“the next tobacco.”42 Obesity-related lawsuits, however, face
numerous challenges and thus far have not been legally
significant.43
Economic pressures are also a significant—though
somewhat less unique—feature of tobacco litigation. In
Barbarians at the Gate, Warren Buffet was quoted as saying,
“I’ll tell you why I like the cigarette business . . . . It costs a
penny to make. Sell it for a dollar. It’s addictive. And there’s
38

Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play’s Third Act: Revisiting Addiction,
Fraud and Consumer Choice in “Third Wave” Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV.
465, 465 (1998).
39
P.A. McDaniel & R.E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris’s Pursuit of
U.S. Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193, 197 (2005). For a
recent example, see Lorrilard Tobacco Company’s efforts to prevent Congress from
regulating menthol cigarettes. Menthol Choice, http://www.mentholchoice.com/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2009) (“Freedom of choice isn’t a privilege. It’s a right. But unless you
speak up, you may not have the right to choose menthol cigarettes for much longer.
Legislators are being pushed by some self-appointed activists to ban all menthol
cigarettes. . . . Speak now . . . [o]r run the risk of starting a trend that may end up with
all of us having fewer rights to choose.”).
40
See Kagan & Nelson, supra note 35, at 32 (“By appealing to values of free
choice and personal responsibility, the tobacco industry has been largely able to deflect
potentially devastating lawsuits and perhaps helped dampen public support for higher
taxes.”).
41
In illegal drug cases, for example, there is no legal industry that can be sued.
42
See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco?, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 50.
43
See Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 404 (2008)
(“No plaintiff has ever prevailed at trial on an obesity claim alleging common law fraud
or negligence, and it is uncertain whether anyone ever will in light of the problems of
pleading and proof attendant to a suit pursued under those theories.”). For example,
although causation can be a significant hurdle in tobacco cases, causation would be far
more complex—if not impossible—to establish in an obesity-focused lawsuit.
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fantastic brand loyalty.”44 Although taxes and inflation have
increased the price of cigarettes, that fundamental equation
remains true. Despite having to pay billions in settlement
payments to the states, the major tobacco companies remain
extremely profitable. Altria (the parent company of Philip
Morris) is by far the largest U.S. tobacco company, with $70
billion in revenue and nearly $10 billion in profits in 2007.45
Other companies like R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard, though
much smaller, are still multi-billion dollar businesses and
substantial employers.46 As tobacco companies are such an
integral part of corporate America, both courts and legislatures
have at times expressed their concerns that curtailing or
eliminating the tobacco industry could have destabilizing
effects on the entire national economy.47
The cultural and economic prominence of tobacco has
loomed over tobacco litigation, leading many judges to assume
that any decision adverse to the tobacco industry defendant
may have severe cultural and economic ramifications.
Consequently, the safe, risk-averse path is the one that
protects the industry from liability. For example, in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson the Supreme Court referenced both
tobacco’s “unique place in American history and society” and its
status as a “significant portion of the American economy” in
concluding that the Food and Drug Administration did not
have the authority to regulate tobacco.48 The Court repeatedly
emphasized that tobacco is not just another product; it is a
product of unparalleled cultural and economic significance.
These factors—the pervasiveness of tobacco in society,
the sheer volume of tobacco litigation, and the cultural and
44

BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL
218 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
John Reid Blackwell, Altria Moves Headquarters from N.Y. to Va. Today:
Shift to Henrico Helps Area Keep Fortune 500/1000 Presence Here on an Even Keel,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 2008, at A1; see also The Fortune 500’s Biggest
Winners: 15. Altria Group, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fortune/
0804/gallery.most_profitable.fortune/15.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
46
See CNNMoney.com, Lorillard Inc. Company Profile, http://money.cnn.com/
quote/snapshot/snapshot.html?symb=LO (last visited Sept. 21, 2009); CNNMoney.com,
Reynolds American Inc. Company Profile, http://money.cnn.com/quote/snapshot/
snapshot.html?symb=RAI (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
47
See infra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Yussuf Saloojee & Elif
Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 78 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 902, 905 (2000) (quoting a Philip Morris executive as stating that
“[e]conomic contribution arguments form the cornerstone of tobacco industry public
affairs”).
48
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
OF RJR NABISCO
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economic significance of the industry—may explain why
tobacco cases have seemingly diverged from prior case law.49
Moreover, the intensity with which tobacco cases have been
litigated helps account for why tobacco cases have been so
influential in the subsequent development of public health law.
The following sections explore these developments,
focusing on (1) the creation of new doctrine in the context of
tobacco cases, and (2) the subsequent impact of these decisions
on public health law doctrine. While the “exceptionalism” of
tobacco has not been the sole factor causing these various areas
of public health law to evolve, it is clearly significant that
tobacco cases have played a prominent and consistent role in
the development of several different doctrinal fields of public
health law.
II.

TOBACCO LITIGATION AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Much of public health law is administrative law. At the
federal level, an alphabet soup of regulatory agencies and
cabinet departments—the FDA, CDC, OSHA, EPA, USDA—
have the primary responsibility for ensuring that we have safe
workplaces, healthy (or at least nontoxic) food, rigorouslytested pharmaceuticals, and coordinated responses to chronic
and infectious diseases. At the state level, local and state
health departments do the day-to-day work of enforcing food
and sanitation codes, conducting safety inspections, controlling
infectious diseases, and, in many cases, providing preventive
health services.
At both the federal and the state level, regulatory
agencies derive their powers from the legislature, and their
authority is limited by statute.50 Delegations of power relating
to public health, however, have tended to be quite broad and
liberally construed.51 For example, the Massachusetts General

49

This is not intended to be an exhaustive list; there may be other factors
that account for the unique manner in which tobacco has received in the courts. For
example, at the state court level, an additional factor may be campaign contributions
by the tobacco companies to elected judges. See, e.g., Kevin McDermott, Donations
Complicate Philip Morris Tobacco Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2005, at
D1.
50
Peter D. Jacobson & Richard E. Hoffman, Regulating Public Health:
Principles and Applications of Administrative Law, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE 23, 25 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2002).
51
See, e.g., Columbia v. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538
(S.C. 1987) (“The delegation of authority to an administrative agency is construed
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Laws provide that “[b]oards of health may make reasonable
health regulations,”52 and this expansive provision has been
interpreted to mean that “boards of health [have] plenary
power to issue reasonable, general health regulations.”53
Similarly, at the federal level, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the FDA “has been delegated broad discretion
by Congress in any number of areas” relating to the regulation
of food and drugs.54 Such broad delegations of power are
deemed necessary because public health authorities may be
called upon to respond to “unanticipated and rapidly emerging
needs and threats.”55
Indeed, because of changes in science, medicine, and
society, the major public health concerns of today bear little
resemblance to the primary public health concerns of a century
ago. Broad delegations of power have allowed public health
authorities to refocus their missions to address new and
unexpected public health needs. The Massachusetts statute
quoted above has remained more or less unchanged since 1816,
despite the fact that the 1816 legislature could not possibly
have imagined the issues boards of health confront today—
West Nile Virus, lead paint exposure, childhood obesity,
bioterrorism preparedness, and others.
In the 1990s, however, when the FDA and state
regulatory agencies attempted to use their broadly-worded
regulatory authority to address tobacco-related harms, the
tobacco industry fought back in court. The resulting decisions
set new precedents that undermined the ability of regulators to
respond to emerging public health threats.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court
blocked the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from
exerting regulatory authority over the tobacco industry, and in
the process restricted the amount of deference provided to
public health authorities.56 In that case, the Court developed
new rules for statutory interpretation that gave future courts
greater flexibility to strike down public health regulations in
liberally when the agency is concerned with the protection of the health and welfare of
the public.”); see also 39 AM. JUR. 2D, Health § 39, n.81 (2008) (collecting cases).
52
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31 (2008).
53
Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 42 (Mass. 2001).
54
See Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986).
55
Sara Rosenbaum et al., New Models for Prevention Systems: Public Health
Emergencies and the Public Health/Managed Care Challenge, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
63, 64 (2002).
56
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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non-tobacco settings. In particular, the Court collapsed the
two-part Chevron test into one step by using the statute’s
“context” to conclude that the statute in question did not
contain any ambiguity.57 By addressing the issue this way, the
Court was able to circumvent Chevron’s far more deferential
second step. Although the Supreme Court’s decision was likely
driven by the cultural and economic importance of tobacco, this
legal mechanism developed in Brown & Williamson was later
used to strike down public health regulations in other fields.
A.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson

In 1996, the FDA, for the first time in its history,
promulgated rules “concerning tobacco products’ promotion,
labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents.”58 The
FDA based this departure from previous practice—the FDA
had previously stated that it lacked authority to regulate
tobacco products59—on new revelations that the tobacco
companies were fully aware of the addictive properties of
nicotine and had in fact manipulated nicotine levels in tobacco
products in order to create and sustain addiction.60 The text of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provided the FDA
with broad authority to regulate “drugs” and “devices” that
were “intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body.”61 Following a year-long investigation, the FDA concluded
that nicotine was a “drug” and that cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products were “drug delivery devices” subject to the
FDA’s jurisdiction.62 Several tobacco companies immediately
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina.
Given the plain language of the statute and the FDA’s
extensive investigative work, it appeared the FDA had a strong
argument.63 Its position was seemingly bolstered by the
57

See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 128.
59
Id. at 146-56 (quoting various statements from FDA officials that the FDA
lacked authority to regulate tobacco products).
60
See William B. Schultz, The FDA’s Decision to Regulate Tobacco Products,
18 PACE L. REV. 27, 28-34 (1997).
61
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h)
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62
See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT (2001) (discussing
the FDA’s decision to assert authority to regulate tobacco products).
63
See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1028 (1998) (“[T]he natural reading of the
58
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Chevron doctrine that the Supreme Court used (and still uses)
to analyze an administrative agency’s construction of its
authorizing statute.64 Pursuant to the Chevron doctrine, if
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,”
the agency must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”65 However, “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”66 This doctrine—also
known as “Chevron deference”—was intended to give
administrative agencies wide latitude in interpreting enabling
statutes. The Court was clear in Chevron that “a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.”67
Despite the plain language of the statute and the
Chevron doctrine’s deference towards agency rulemaking, the
Court concluded in a 5-4 ruling that the FDA lacked authority
to regulate tobacco products.68 Although the statute said
nothing explicitly about whether tobacco could be characterized
as a “drug delivery device” (in contrast to numerous other
federal statutes that expressly exempted tobacco products from
their scope), the Court nonetheless found that Congress had
“directly spoken” to the issue and precluded FDA regulation.69
Instead of reviewing whether the statute was
“ambiguous” and, if so, whether the FDA’s construction of the
statute was “permissible,” the Court collapsed these two steps
into one and conducted its own investigation into the
“contextual” meaning of the FDCA’s terms. It first reviewed the
structure of the FDCA and concluded that “if tobacco products
were ‘devices’ under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to
remove them from the market.”70 While perhaps a plausible
text appears to be strongly supportive of the FDA. It suggests not ambiguity but a
relatively clear understanding like that of the current FDA.”).
64
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984).
65
Id. at 842-43.
66
Id. at 843.
67
Id. at 844. The Chevron test “appears to call for a large degree of judicial
deference to agency interpretations.” Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 824 (2006).
68
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
69
Id. at 160-61.
70
Id. at 135.
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reading of the FDCA, the FDA had considered and rejected this
interpretation of the FDCA during its rulemaking process. It
had instead concluded that “the record does not establish
that . . . a ban is the appropriate public health response under
the [FDCA]” and that the FDCA allowed the agency to adopt
regulatory restrictions short of an outright ban.71 Rather than
view this provision of the statute as ambiguous and then
consider whether the FDA’s interpretation of the statute was
reasonable, the Court substituted its own interpretation of the
statute for the FDA’s.72
Although the FDA had not attempted to ban tobacco
products, the Court then used its first conclusion (if the FDA
had authority to regulate tobacco products, it would have to
remove them from the market) as the starting point for its
subsequent analysis. It then concluded that because Congress
had made several statements in other statutes implicitly
suggesting that tobacco products would remain available for
sale, it could not have intended for the FDA to ban tobacco
products. Thus, Congress had “spoken directly to the FDA’s
authority to regulate tobacco” and denied it such authority.73
Contextual
clues—in
this
case,
subsequent
congressional actions regarding tobacco—would surely have
been relevant for determining whether the FDA’s application of
the FDCA was “reasonable.” The Court, however, used its
questionable analysis of the statute’s context in order to
conclude that the statute itself was unambiguous with respect
to the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco. In essence, it read
the patent ambiguity out of the statute instead of deferentially
reviewing whether the FDA’s application of the statute was
“reasonable.”74 Rather than employing the two-step Chevron
test, the Court collapsed the Chevron analysis into a one-step

71

Id. at 139.
For a forceful argument that the FDCA did permit the FDA to take
remedial action short of a complete ban of cigarettes, see id. at 174-81 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
73
Id. at 143-44 (majority opinion).
74
Beyond the Court’s problematic restructuring of the Chevron test, its
decision ran contrary to the general scheme of public health law, which typically
provides regulatory agencies with broad authority to address new public health
threats. Writing in a different administrative law context, Justice Stevens wrote that
the Court should be particularly deferential to agency interpretations “in a statutory
regime so obviously meant to maximize administrative flexibility.” MCI Telecom. Corp.
v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 244 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72
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“contextual” reading that allowed it to avoid a more deferential
review of the agency’s action.75
The Court’s sleight of hand was legally questionable,
but it seems to have reflected the majority’s point of view that
tobacco products were simply different. It is hardly unusual for
regulatory agencies to assert jurisdiction over new products or
activities when new facts warrant it, and prior to Brown &
Williamson those extensions of regulatory oversight were
generally upheld. For example, consider Cass Sunstein’s
discussion of the regulation of DDT:
[I]t is generally agreed that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the EPA to regulate DDT as a
product raising “a substantial question” of human safety, but that
this authority does not rest on a judgment that the Congress that
enacted FIFRA believed that the EPA could regulate DDT. On the
contrary, when introduced, DDT was thought to be unproblematic
and entirely safe, and hence the enacting Congress did not
contemplate that FIFRA would authorize EPA regulation of DDT.
The EPA nevertheless possesses just such authority. Statutes
regulating health and safety quite routinely contain broad language
authorizing agencies to regulate articles or substances if the
statutory criteria are met. Whether Congress believed that the
statutory criteria were met when it enacted the relevant legislation
is beside the point unless Congress embodied that belief in law.76

In Brown & Williamson, however, the majority went out
of its way to emphasize the uniqueness of tobacco. It wrote:
This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to
Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to
regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the
American economy . . . . Owing to its unique place in American
75

Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule argue that Chevron’s inquiry is
really only one step and that the distinction between the two steps has always been
artificial. See Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597 (2009). They claim that “[t]he single question is whether the
agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 599.
Thus, while Brown & Williamson was decided under Step One, they write that “[i]t
would have been equally easy . . . for the Court to find under Step One that the full
scope of the FDA’s statutory jurisdiction is ambiguous . . . but to declare that the FDA’s
assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products was unreasonable under Chevron Step
Two.” Id. at 599-600. In my view, this analysis misses the mark. While the question
asked under the two steps may be similar, the deference with which the question is
approached is not. If the Court construes the statue to have a narrow meaning under
Step One, it need not provide deference to the agency’s interpretation. In Brown &
Williamson, had the Court conceded that there was ambiguity in the statue, it would
have been nearly impossibly to find that the FDA was not “reasonable” in concluding
that tobacco met the statutory definition. That is why the Court labored so hard to
force its analysis into Step One.
76
Sunstein, supra note 63, at 1030-31.
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history and society, tobacco has its own unique political history . . . .
[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate
a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in
so cryptic a fashion.77

Perhaps driven by the political salience of the tobacco
issue, the Brown & Williamson case also caused several
justices to depart from their typical approach to administrative
cases. The Court’s most ardent textualists—Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas—joined an opinion that avoided addressing the
plain meaning of the text and instead looked carefully at postenactment Congressional actions.78 Meanwhile, the majority
opinion made a point of noting that Justice Breyer—author of
the dissenting opinion—had previously written a law review
article suggesting that judges should be more hesitant to find a
broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency when
“the legal question is an important one.”79
The majority was of course correct that tobacco
presented a unique case. As discussed above, tobacco has
certainly had its own “political history” and a powerful
influence on American society.80 The majority clearly felt that
tobacco regulation was not just a new application of broad
regulatory authority, but instead that tobacco (even if it were
to be considered a “drug delivery device”) was somehow
different, deserving of an implied exception to the statute’s
broad language.
The majority’s conclusion can also been seen as an
example of inter-branch communication that addressed
unstated political tensions. According to Jonathan Turley, the
Court’s decision is better read as a response to the FDA’s
attempt to circumvent Congress. Turley writes:
77

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60. As detailed in the Court’s
decision, previous FDA commissioners had expressed the view that the FDA did not
have the authority to regulate tobacco. Id. at 145. The FDA, led by Commissioner
David Kessler, changed its position after its investigation indicated that the tobacco
companies were aware of nicotine’s addictive properties and had engineered their
tobacco products in order to create and maintain addiction. Previous FDA
commissioners had not been aware of such facts. See KESSLER, supra note 62, at 381
(“[The Supreme Court justices] were unable to recognize how much had changed, how
much more we understood, not only about the effects of nicotine, but about the extent
of the industry’s knowledge. We finally had evidence of intent.”).
78
See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 226 (2000).
79
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
80
See supra Part I.C.

2009]

IMPACT OF TOBACCO-RELATED DECISIONS

21

The circumvention of Congress in the FDA case was open and
notorious. Not only did the FDA break from its long-held position
that it lacked the authority to regulate tobacco, but prior to seeking
this authority through the courts, the Clinton administration was
rebuffed in an attempt to secure a legislative mandate.81

In this view, the Court was trying to strike down an end-run
around Congress and simply restore tobacco regulation to the
status quo ante. Since this reasoning was not made explicit,
however, the Court’s facially neutral application of the Chevron
test—which Turley characterizes as “a strikingly contextual
view”82—was established as precedent for future plaintiffs to
utilize in challenging other regulatory actions.83
B.

Subsequent Applications of Chevron and FDA v. Brown
& Williamson

Even without the tobacco-focused Brown & Williamson
decision, perhaps the Supreme Court would have moved
towards a less deferential application of the Chevron test in
any event. Other notable decisions preceding Brown &
Williamson—in particular, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T 84—have been similarly described as “discretion-denying”
decisions that evaded the requirements of Chevron.85 Moreover,
later cases that did not cite or reference Brown & Williamson
also imposed further limitations on the reach of Chevron
deference.86 In general, this long-term effort by the Court to
undermine or limit Chevron deference has been attributed to
81

Turley, supra note 23, at 457.
Id. at 456.
83
As previously noted, nine years after the Brown & Williamson decision, the
U.S. Congress did grant the FDA limited regulatory authority over the tobacco
industry. See supra note 11. Congress’s decision to belatedly revisit the issue does
nothing to limit the ability of future litigants to use Brown & Williamson as a
precedent when seeking to strike down administrative actions.
84
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
85
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 243, 244 (2006).
In MCI, the Supreme Court held that the FCC had exceeded its authority in ruling
that long-distance carriers other than AT&T would no longer have to file their rates
with the FCC. 521 U.S. at 218; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (“[I]n recent Terms the application
of Chevron has resulted in less deference to executive interpretations than was the case
in the pre-Chevron era. Thus, instead of functioning as a ‘counter-Marbury,’ there are
signs that Chevron is being transformed by the Court into a new judicial mandate ‘to
say what the law is.’”).
86
See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (suggesting that
less formal administrative rulemaking processes were not entitled to full Chevron
deference).
82
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the Court’s desire to assert its own authority and retain some
oversight over administrative decisions, a desire obviously in
tension with the dictates of Chevron.87 One could read Brown &
Williamson as one example among many of the Court asserting
its right to restrict agency discretion, and thus its uniqueness
should not be overstated. Nonetheless, subsequent applications
of the precedent established in Brown & Williamson show that
the case was particularly influential in the field of public
health, where, as discussed above, a significant degree of
agency flexibility is needed to protect against emerging public
health threats.88
1. Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (2003)
It did not take long for the ruling of Brown &
Williamson to start impacting public health cases outside the
tobacco control arena. Even before Brown & Williamson was
decided, a group of diet supplement manufacturers filed a
lawsuit challenging the FDA’s regulatory authority in another
area.89 To deal with the problem of iron poisoning—a leading
cause of death among young children—the FDA had issued
regulations requiring dietary supplements containing high
doses of iron to be distributed in unit-dose packages.90 In
87

See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 85, at 998 (“[Chevron] reduc[es] the role of the
courts to a point that threatens to undermine the principal constitutional constraint on
agency misbehavior. Given these failings, it is small wonder that the Court often seems
wary of the Chevron doctrine, applying it inconsistently at best.”); Eric R. Womack,
Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s
Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 291
(2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has chosen to limit the scope of Chevron and refocus the
inquiry into congressional intent in order to limit unprincipled deference and
delegation to agencies that can exercise such power without sufficient procedural
protections.”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1202 (2008) (suggesting that the Supreme Court applies
a “continuum of deference” and is less deferential when agency decisions involve
“larger normative concerns”).
88
See, e.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from
Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 779-80 (2007) (“In Chevron, one of the
Court’s rationales for deferring to the agency’s interpretation was that by enacting
gaps and creating ambiguities, Congress intended to delegate implicitly to the agency.
But in a series of cases, starting with FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Court rejected, or at least limited, this rationale.”); James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of
Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 976 (2008) (“[Brown & Williamson] was a dramatic
decision that has had ripple effects on the law of deference to administrative rules.”).
89
Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (Nutritional I), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22330 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2000), rev’d, 318 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2003).
90
Id. at *3-5.
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Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA, an association of
manufacturers challenged the rule, asserting that the FDA had
exceeded its authority in promulgating the regulations. They
argued that the FDCA did cover issues of poison prevention
and that such concerns could only be addressed by the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC).91
As the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, and the plaintiffs
immediately brought it to the attention of Judge Sterling
Johnson, Jr. Presumably relying on the Supreme Court’s
statement that FDA v. Brown & Williamson was a “unique”
case, Judge Johnson wrote that “the nature of the tobaccospecific legislation makes the case inapplicable here,” and that
he would instead follow the dictates of Chevron.92 Judge
Johnson went on to conclude that the FDA rule was authorized
under either prong of the Chevron test; by its plain meaning,
the FDCA authorized the FDA’s exercise of authority, and even
assuming arguendo that there was some ambiguity in the
statute, the FDA’s construction of the statute was a permissible
one.93
Saying nothing about the uniqueness of tobacco, the
Second Circuit relied heavily on the “instructive guidance”
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson in reversing the district
court’s opinion.94 Using Brown & Williamson as precedent, it
concluded the language of a statute must be read in light of
subsequent congressional action. The court wrote:
Following [United States v. Estate of] Romani and Brown &
Williamson, we would not defer to the FDA regarding its
interpretation of ambiguous language in the [FDCA] where doing so
would allow the FDA to circumvent the detailed regulatory
scheme . . . set forth by Congress in the [Poison Prevention
Packaging Act (which granted limited authority for poison control to
the CPSC)].95

As the FDA had argued, however, the Poison Prevention Act
did not in any way directly limit the FDA’s authority (though
Congress certainly could have included such a provision).96
91

Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (Nutritional II), 318 F.3d 92, 94 (2d

Cir. 2003).
92
93
94
95
96

Nutritional I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22330 at *9 n.3.
Id. at *11-12.
Nutritional II, 318 F.3d at 102.
Id. at 104.
Nutritional I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22330 at *7-8.
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Although the court purported to apply step two of the Chevron
test, it was clear that the Second Circuit was, like the Supreme
Court in Brown & Williamson, using a “contextual” reading of
the FDCA as the basis for substituting its own judgment for
that of the FDA.
2. Supreme Beef Processors (2000) and Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (2002)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson has also been used as
authority by several district courts that have struck down
health-related regulations. In these cases, FDA v. Brown &
Williamson seems to have tipped the scales, providing these
courts with legal support for overturning a regulation where a
more deferential posture would have led to the opposite result.
For example, in Supreme Beef Processors v. United
States Department of Agriculture, the regulation at issue
involved the testing of processed beef for salmonella.97 Under
the relevant statute, the USDA was authorized to bar the sale
or transport of meat if “it has been prepared, packed or held
under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become
contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered
injurious to health.”98 Since salmonella results from unsanitary
conditions and is the leading cause of food-borne illness, USDA
developed a salmonella test to measure compliance with this
provision.99 Supreme Beef Processors—which had failed the
salmonella test three different times—argued that the USDA
had exceeded its authority in testing for salmonella, because
the salmonella could have resulted from contaminated beef
entering the assembly line, and not (or not solely) from
unsanitary conditions in the plant itself.100 The court agreed
with this reasoning, concluding that the USDA could not block
the sale of Supreme Beef Processor’s meat because “the
agency—in effect—never found the conditions of Supreme
Beef’s plant insanitary”—only the meat itself.101 This exercise in
semantic nitpicking, which produced a result quite unsettling
to anyone who eats meat, runs contrary to the deferential
approach of Chevron. The court, however, based its approach
97
98
99
100
101

113 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048 (N.D. Tx. 2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1052 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4)).
Id.
Id. at 1052-53.
Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
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on Brown & Williamson, quoting its language that “[t]he
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only
become evident when placed in context.”102 Like the Supreme
Court in Brown & Williamson, the district court then
proceeded to read the ambiguity out of the statute by finding a
“contextual meaning” (in this case, based on the court’s
analysis of the overall structure of the Federal Meat Inspection
Act) that limited the USDA’s authority.103 Nowhere in the
decision was there a mention of the “uniqueness” of tobacco (or,
for that matter, any discussion of the facts of Brown &
Williamson).
In dealing with a somewhat more complex issue, the
D.C. District Court in Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA struck down an FDA regulation
requiring most new pharmaceuticals to be tested for efficacy in
pediatric populations.104 The FDA had claimed authority to act
under broad enabling provisions of the FDCA.105 The plaintiffs,
citing a later statute that addressed pediatric testing more
specifically (though without directly limiting the broader
provisions of the FDCA), argued that the FDA had exceeded its
authority.106 In ruling for the plaintiffs, the court directly
rejected the conception that the tobacco issue addressed in
Brown & Williamson was a unique or unusual case. Instead,
the court wrote:
This situation is therefore analogous to the one faced by the
Supreme Court in Brown & Williamson; the FDA and Congress have
both spoken and have taken two different approaches to respond to
the same public health issue. Brown & Williamson suggests that by
enacting a “distinct regulatory scheme” to address a given issue . . .
Congress demonstrates its intention to occupy the field, and any
attempt by the FDA to intervene with an inconsistent regime shall
be deemed in excess of its authority. This militates strongly in favor
of concluding that the FDA exceeded its authority when it enacted
the [rule requiring pediatric tests].107

Again, other congressional action in a similar field may have
been relevant to whether the FDA’s interpretation of the scope
of its authority was “reasonable.” But instead of deferentially
102

Id. at 1051 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).
103
Id.
104
226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 205 (D.D.C. 2002).
105
Id. at 212-13.
106
Id. at 205, 219.
107
Id. at 219 (citations omitted).

26

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

asking whether the FDA had acted reasonably in applying an
ambiguous statute, the court avoided the question by ignoring
the statute’s patent ambiguity and collapsing the Chevron
analysis into one step. Indeed, the court’s analysis—building on
Brown & Williamson—suggests that anytime Congress has
passed a law addressing a public health issue, it has intended
to preclude any further regulatory action on the subject. Such a
doctrine is a drastic departure from Chevron’s deferential
approach to agency regulations and would severely tie the
hands of public health agencies.
In sum, Brown & Williamson “embed[s] an unhealthy
status quo bias into administrative law,” making agencies wary
of using their existing authority to tackle new challenges, even
when the broad language of their authorizing statutes could
justify such action.108 This “status quo bias” is particularly
dangerous in the field of public health, where the next public
health challenge is always an unknown, and agency flexibility
is therefore crucial.109 Ironically, in dealing with the issue of
tobacco—a public health challenge with a very long history—
the Supreme Court may have weakened the government’s
ability to adequately prepare for and address future public
health challenges. Although the Supreme Court stated in
Brown & Williamson that tobacco was a “unique case,” the
discussion above demonstrates that Brown & Williamson was
quickly seized upon by those seeking to challenge government
regulations in a variety of other contexts.
C.

State Analogues

The problem of attempted tobacco regulation leading to
new constraints on agency authority is not limited to the
federal government. The same dynamic plays out at the state
level, and given that state public health authorities are often
the first line of defense in dealing with public health challenges
and crises, this is potentially even more dangerous.

108

See Sunstein, supra note 85, at 246.
Of course, a deferential posture towards agency decisions can be
problematic from a public health perspective if agencies are interpreting their own
authorizing statutes narrowly or using their discretion not to regulate public health
concerns. From a long-term perspective, however, this is less troubling. An agency’s
decision not to act can be easily reversed (by a subsequent administrator or
administration). A Supreme Court ruling explicitly limiting the scope of agency
discretion cannot be so easily undone.
109
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Although the legal reasoning has differed from the
federal cases, state courts have been similarly reluctant to
allow public health entities to apply their broad regulatory
authority to the issue of tobacco. In some cases, state courts
have relied on the absence of an explicit delegation to strike
down tobacco-related regulations, even when the same courts
had never insisted on such express delegation in the past.
For example, in D.A.B.E. v. Toledo-Lucas County, the
Ohio Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a local
board of health had the authority to limit smoking in public
places.110 As in Brown & Williamson, at issue was a novel
application of extremely broad statutory authority. In that
case, the relevant Ohio law, Ohio Revised Code § 3709.21,
stated that “[t]he board of health of a general health district
may make such orders and regulations as are necessary for its
own government, for the public health, the prevention or
restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or
suppression of nuisances.”111 The plain language seemed to
provide authority for the secondhand smoke regulations at
issue, particularly since the Surgeon General of the United
States had found that “nonsmokers are placed at increased risk
for developing disease as the result of exposure to [secondhand]
smoke” and that “measures to protect the public health are
required now.”112 Nonetheless, the court went out of its way to
avoid directly addressing the plain meaning of the text.
Echoing Brown & Williamson, the court wrote:
[T]he natural meaning of words is not always conclusive as to the
construction of statutes. While it is a long-recognized canon of
statutory construction that the words and phrases used by the
General Assembly will be construed in their usual, ordinary
meaning, that is not so when a contrary intention of the legislature
clearly appears. Accordingly and for the following reasons, we find
that the General Assembly has not indicated any intent through
[Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.21], or otherwise, to vest local boards of
health with unlimited authority to adopt regulations addressing all
public-health concerns.113

The court went on to conclude—for the first time in the long
history of the statue—that § 3709.21 was “a rules-enabling
110

773 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ohio 2002).
Id. at 541.
112
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at xi-xii (1986),
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/C/P/M/ (follow “PDF” hyperlink).
113
D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 542 (citations omitted).
111
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statute, not a provision granting substantive regulatory
authority.”114 It explained that in order for public health
authorities to address a particular public health issue, they
would need to point to another statute providing explicit
authority for such an action, in addition to the general
rulemaking powers provided in § 3709.21.115 In order to reach
this conclusion, the court had to ignore or reinterpret several
Ohio Supreme Court cases that had upheld health authority
regulations based solely on the authority provided by § 3709.21
or its predecessor statute.116 Indeed, in previous cases the court
had emphasized the need for regulatory flexibility in
addressing public health challenges, writing (when referring to
the predecessor of § 3709.21): “Where a law relates to a police
regulation for the protection of public health, and it is
impossible or impractical to provide specific standards, and to
do so would defeat the legislative object sought to be
accomplished, such law is valid and constitutional without
providing such standards.”117
How had the Ohio Supreme Court reached a conclusion
that seemed to reject its own precedents? The Court semiapologetically wrote that “[o]ur disposition of this matter turns
on issues of law and not on the deleterious effect of
environmental tobacco smoke, more commonly known as
secondhand smoke.”118 Nonetheless, it seems virtually certain
that the unique political salience of the issue at hand—the
regulation of smoking in public places—was the driving force
behind the Court’s decision.
As in Brown & Williamson, the Court likely viewed the
Board of Health’s action as an end run around the legislature
on a controversial political issue. In a brief aside, the Court
wrote:
Administrative regulations cannot dictate public policy but rather
can only develop and administer policy already established by the
General Assembly. In promulgating the Clean Indoor Air
114

Id. at 547.
Id. at 547-49.
116
See, e.g., Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dep’t of Health, 567
N.E.2d 1018, 1027 (Ohio 1991); Schlenker v. Bd. of Health, 167 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio
1960). For a persuasive discussion of this issue reaching the opposite conclusion from
the Ohio Supreme Court (though striking down the regulation at issue on other
grounds), see Cookie’s Diner v. Columbus Bd. of Health, 640 N.E.2d 1231, 1235-37
(Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994).
117
Weber v. Bd. of Health, 74 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ohio 1947).
118
D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 547.
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Regulation, petitioners engaged in policy-making requiring a
balancing of social, political, economic, and privacy concerns. Such
concerns are legislative in nature, and by engaging in such actions,
petitioners have gone beyond administrative rule-making and
usurped power delegated to the General Assembly.119

In short, the Court felt that tobacco regulation was a
contentious public issue most properly resolved by the
legislative branch, and not an unelected Board of Health.
Courts rarely view administrative rulemaking as a problem
when non-tobacco regulations are at issue, despite the fact that
every public health regulation is a policy-making exercise
“requiring a balancing of social, political, economic, and privacy
concerns.”120 When tobacco is at issue, however, judges are often
sympathetic to the argument that decisions about such a
weighty issue—with its powerful historical, social, cultural,
and political baggage—cannot be left to public health
authorities.121
Ultimately, the D.A.B.E. decision did not derail progress
towards smoke-free regulations in Ohio—it merely rechanneled
the effort away from health departments and into the political
arena. In 2006, Ohio voters passed a ballot measure prohibiting
smoking in nearly all indoor public places.122 Like Brown &
Williamson, however, D.A.B.E. still stands as a precedent that
may hamper regulatory efforts in other areas of public health.
In essence, the D.A.B.E. holding means that boards of public
health in Ohio can only be reactive; they are prohibited from
119

Id. at 546 (citations omitted). At the time of this decision, there were some
state laws addressing smoking in public places. Unlike Brown & Williamson, however,
the court did not suggest that these other statutes implicitly limited the authority
boards of public health to regulate in this area. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3791.031 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing for nonsmoking sections in various “place[s] of
public assembly”).
120
D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 546. For example, food safety regulations—
regulations that can be enforced with intrusive inspections—certainly implicate all of
these concerns. It would be significantly cheaper to run a restaurant without complying
with food safety regulations and the accompanying paperwork requirements. Public
health departments, however, must balance economic efficiency against the concern for
the health and safety of the diners. Rarely are public health authorities accused of
“lawmaking” when they promulgate new food safety regulations. (Such charges have
been leveled against health departments that have recently banned trans-fats. To date
however, legal challenges to such bans have not succeeded.)
121
See, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 12, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (1987)
(striking down secondhand smoke regulation promulgated by the New York Public
Health Counsel, and writing that “[s]triking the proper balance among health
concerns, cost and privacy interests . . . is a uniquely legislative function”).
122
The ballot measure is codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3794.01-.09
(West 2009). For general information on the law, see Ohio Dep’t of Health, Smoke-free
Workplace Program, http://www.ohionosmokelaw.gov (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
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proactively addressing public health threats that have not yet
received the sustained public attention needed to produce
legislative action.123 The public health implications of such a
ruling are impossible to measure, but they will be all too real
when public health authorities are unable to address future
public health concerns in a timely manner.124
III.

TOBACCO LITIGATION AND PERSONAL INJURY/PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CLAIMS

As discussed in Part I, tobacco litigation has been, in the
words of Robert Rabin, “unique in the annals of tort
litigation.”125 This section addresses the legal impact of tobaccorelated personal injury lawsuits on the field of public health
litigation. Tobacco litigation has led to pro-defendant rulings in
the areas of preemption, class action certification, and punitive
damages that have, in turn, significantly limited the potential
impact of public health litigation in other areas. Before
exploring the degree to which tobacco cases have influenced
personal injury law, two detours are in order: a discussion of
the role of personal injury litigation in promoting public health,
and a very brief history of early tobacco litigation.
A.

Public Health Litigation: Pro and Con

Whether lawsuits brought by private citizens can
effectively promote public health goals is a question that has
been debated for years. Jon Vernick, et al, present the general
argument in favor of public health litigation as follows:
As a society, we make decisions about how to balance the risks and
benefits of consumer products. One way we strike that balance is by
allowing litigation against product makers when risks become too
great. In this way, litigation can act as a public health feedback
mechanism to affect manufacturers’ safety practices. If a product is
considered unsafe (or society is less willing to accept certain risks),

123

D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 549.
The D.A.B.E. decision has not been the basis for court challenges to healthrelated regulations, but that is likely because the bright line rule laid down by D.A.B.E.
has provided clear guidance to regulatory agencies regarding the limits of their
authority (though it muddled Ohio’s rules of statutory construction for everyone else).
At least one Ohio Attorney General opinion has used D.A.B.E. as its authority for
concluding that regulations being contemplated by a health department were outside
the scope of its authority. See Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2007-005, at 5, 6-10 (2007), 2007 WL
1173766 (regarding burial of bodies on private lands).
125
Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857.
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more litigation may follow. As manufacturers respond, products can
become safer, the likelihood of successful litigation is reduced, and
fewer lawsuits (and injuries) will result.126

Although this is a standard argument in favor of health-related
litigation, it is easy to see how tobacco—a product that cannot
be made safe—does not fit easily into this paradigm.
In addition to prompting changes in product design and
serving the traditional tort litigation goal of compensating
injured victims, others have argued that public health
litigation can also (a) increase costs for dangerous products
(thereby decreasing demand and/or forcing the industry to
internalize costs imposed on others), (b) bring health risks to
the attention of regulators and legislators, (c) heighten public
awareness of public health risks (potentially leading to social
change), (d) uncover industry misconduct, and (e) deter future
misconduct.127 They point to a list of public health
improvements credited to personal injury and products liability
litigation: cars with airbags and shoulder restraints, the
removal of dangerous products (such as asbestos and the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device) from the marketplace, and
the clean-up of environmental toxins.128
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that
public health litigation constitutes public policy advocacy by
other means (often by parties who have been unable to
convince the legislature to adopt their position), and as such, it
is an anti-democratic “misuse of the courts.”129 Furthermore,
some public health specialists have argued that courts are not
the proper venue for addressing public health concerns because
courts have limited remedies at their disposal (typically
monetary damages that may unfairly single out particular
defendants) and flexible regulatory bodies are better equipped
126

Jon S. Vernick, Lainie Rutkow & Daniel A. Salmon, Availability of
Litigation as a Public Health Tool for Firearm Injury Prevention: Comparison of Guns,
Vaccines, and Motor Vehicles, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1991, 1995 (2007).
127
See R. Daynard, Why Tobacco Litigation?, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 1, 1-2
(2003); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Litigation to Make Public Health Policy: Theoretical
and Empirical Challenges in Assessing Product Liability, Tobacco, and Gun Litigation,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 556, 558 (2004); Michelle M. Mello, Eric B. Rimm & David M.
Studdert, The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for
Obesity, 22 HEALTH AFF. 207, 212-14 (2003). For an optimistic view of the potential
impact of litigation on public health, see generally Parmet, supra note 6.
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See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health
Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 225 (2002); Wendy Wagner,
When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J.
693, 711-713 (2007).
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Lytton, supra note 127, at 559.
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to deal with public health concerns.130 Finally, some have
argued that lawsuits are simply an ineffective means of
promoting public health.131
It is unnecessary (and would be futile) to try to resolve
this longstanding dispute here. Regardless, it seems clear that
the ability of personal injury lawsuits to serve public health
ends has been significantly eroded by judicial decisions over
the past several decades. It is also clear that tobacco-related
decisions have played a prominent role in this erosion. These
developments are particularly troubling if one agrees with the
premise that private litigation “does play a vital and
indispensable role in ensuring the safety and accountability of
product manufacturers and industrial polluters.”132 Even if one
rejects the social significance of public health litigation,
however, it is still important for those involved in healthrelated litigation to understand the ways in which relevant
legal doctrines have been influenced by tobacco litigation.
B.

Early Tobacco Litigation and Cipollone

Tobacco litigation has occurred in three distinct
“waves.”133 The first and longest wave began soon after the
initial revelations about the connection between smoking and
lung cancer in the 1950s, and lasted until the 1980s. The
plaintiffs were almost all lung cancer victims or their families,
and their claims were “grounded in varying theories of
negligence, misrepresentation and breach of warranty.”134 Due
to the tobacco industry’s early adoption of an aggressive,
“scorched earth” strategy, few of these cases made it to trial. Of
those that did, the industry’s argument that the connection
130

See Jacobson & Soliman, supra note 128, at 226-28 (summarizing
arguments against using litigation to make public health policy). They note the concern
that “[p]ublic policy might well be distorted by an attempt to extract financial
concessions at the expense of public health objectives.” Id. at 227.
131
See, e.g., id. at 233 (reviewing cases and finding that “gun litigation has
not succeeded at all”). For an extremely critical assessment of public health litigation,
see Joe Nocera, Forget Fair; It’s Litigation as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at C1
(“Mass torts have become a rogue form of regulation, and not necessarily in the public
interest.”).
132
Wagner, supra note 128, at 731-32.
133
See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation,
in REGULATING TOBACCO 176 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Rabin, Third Wave] (discussing the “waves” of tobacco litigation).
134
D. DOUGLAS BLANKE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOWARDS HEALTH WITH
JUSTICE: LITIGATION AND PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS TOOLS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 16
(2002), available at http://www.emro.who.int/TFI/Litigation.pdf.
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between smoking and lung cancer had not been conclusively
established successfully defeated all claims of liability.
When the causation defense became untenable in the
1980s, the tobacco industry deftly shifted its argument to
defend against the “second wave” of tobacco litigation:
For years they had denied their products were unsafe. Now they
insisted instead that the hazards they had indignantly denied for so
long were no longer preposterous, but were suddenly, in fact,
“common knowledge” — so much so that smokers were fully aware of
them and had, in fact, “assumed the risk” of death and disease. So
well known were these risks, manufacturers argued, that smokers
could not claim to have “relied” on the industry’s own denials.
Perhaps most audaciously, manufacturers were able to invoke these
defenses without so much as acknowledging the inconsistencies of
their positions, and without ever conceding that tobacco causes
disease.135

As with all of the first wave cases, the hundreds of second wave
plaintiffs were similarly unable to win a case against the
tobacco industry—until Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which
ushered in the “third wave” of tobacco litigation.136
Cipollone was the first case in which the tobacco
industry lost a jury verdict—a $400,000 award to the plaintiff.
The breakthrough of Cipollone was driven by the plaintiff’s
attorney’s ability to
gain access to internal industry documents and testimony of former
industry employees to an extent then unprecedented in the fortyyear history of litigation against the industry—documents and
testimony indicating the industry had discouraged internal efforts to
take cognizance of the health risks of smoking and to develop a safer
cigarette.137

This verdict demonstrated that the tobacco industry was not
invincible in court, and it seemed to presage an onslaught of
litigation that would bury the tobacco industry under the
weight of its own documents.
But the tobacco industry survived this “third wave” of
litigation intact, and in some ways emerged even stronger than
before. Its success was built in large part on its ability to
persuade the court to adopt new legal doctrines limiting its
liability, including an expansive notion of federal preemption, a
narrow view of class action certification, and Due Process
135
136
137

Id. at 17.
Id.
Rabin, Third Wave, supra note 133, at 178 (citations omitted).
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limitations on punitive damages. These doctrines not only
helped the tobacco industry to endure the “third wave” of
tobacco litigation; they also dramatically reshaped the legal
landscape for other types of public health litigation.
C.

Preemption
1. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.

After decades of frustration, the jury verdict in
Cipollone provided the first glimmer of hope for those hoping to
defeat the tobacco industry in court. These hopes were quickly
dashed, however, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
Cipollone appeal and ultimately ruled that the common law
failure to warn claims against Liggett were preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).138
The FCLAA is the statute that requires warning labels to be
placed on cigarette packs, and the primary purpose of its
preemption provision had been to prevent “diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations.”139 Though the Court interpreted the authorizing
clause in FDA v. Brown & Williamson narrowly in order to
preclude FDA regulation of tobacco, it took the opposite
approach (though with a similar substantive result) in
Cipollone, reading the preemption clause of the FCLAA broadly
in order to preempt tort suits against the tobacco industry.
The Supreme Court’s opinion did not directly suggest
that preemption principles should operate differently in the
context of tobacco, but its decision was a striking departure
from past precedent. At issue was § 5 of the FCLAA (titled
“Preemption”), which read in part:
(b) . . . No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter.140

Every circuit court that had addressed the issue had concluded
that the preemption provision of § 5(b) did not expressly
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Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (expressing congressional intent in the preamble to
the FCLAA).
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Id. § 1334(b).
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preclude common law tort claims.141 Courts assumed that the
preemption provision applied only to affirmative regulatory
action by state legislatures and regulators, not to common law
litigation. For example, the Third Circuit (from which the
Cipollone appeal originated) had noted that Congress could
have easily included a provision in the FCLAA preempting
common law tort claims—as it had done in other statutes—but
it had not.142
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, gave
lip service to the presumption that “the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,”143
but then proceeded to blithely ignore the intent of Congress in
finding that “[t]he phrase ‘no requirement or prohibition’
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive
enactments and common law.”144 Justice Stevens wrote that
“[a]lthough portions of the legislative history of the 1969 Act
suggest that Congress was primarily concerned with positive
enactments by states and localities, the language of the Act
plainly reaches beyond such enactments.”145 In other words, the
plurality opinion held that since the language of the statute
was so abundantly clear, there was no need to consider
evidence regarding Congress’s intent. Given that the circuit
courts had not found any such clarity in Congress’s words—and
given that there was considerable evidence of a different
congressional intent—this was an astounding conclusion.146 In a
partial dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote that “[u]nlike the
plurality, I am unwilling to believe that Congress, without any
141

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing cases).
142
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986), rev’d,
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FCLAA preemption provision] does not make any reference to a state tort claim, even
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the Act does not expressly preempt [the plaintiff’s] products liability claims.”
Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
144
Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
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Id. (citations omitted).
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464 U.S. 238 (1984), all nine members of the Court had agreed that actions to recover
compensatory damages survived sweeping federal pre-emption in the nuclear safety
field.” Lars Noah, The Preemption Morass: Medtronic Leaves Muddled the Question of
Whether or When Federal Law Preempts Tort Law Claims Against Defective Medical
Devices, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S37.
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mention of state common-law damages actions or its intention
dramatically to expand the scope of federal pre-emption, would
have eliminated the only means of judicial recourse for those
injured by the cigarette manufacturers’ unlawful conduct.”147
Although the methodology differed, the Court’s
approach in Cipollone presaged the later Brown & Williamson
decision. In both cases, the Court was faced with a legal rule
instructing it to use a highly deferential approach in
interpreting statutory language, yet it refused to recognize any
ambiguity in the statutes. In Brown & Williamson, the Court
looked at the context of subsequent congressional actions in
order to find the statute’s “clear meaning,” whereas Cipollone
ignored contrary congressional intent and redefined the
relevant terms for itself. In both instances, the Court supported
the tobacco companies’ position, applying its own reading of the
statute instead of deferring to the administrative agency (in
Brown & Williamson) or the states (in Cipollone).
As in Brown & Williamson, it seems likely that
unspoken policy concerns and questions of institutional
competency lay behind the Court’s decision in Cipollone. Allan
Brandt writes:
Tobacco litigation became a lightning rod for a larger public debate
about the role of tort litigation in American society. For critics of the
liability revolution, suits against tobacco companies epitomized the
excesses of tort claims, if not the ultimate perversion of the courts.
According to such arguments—encouraged by the industry—tobacco
litigation was an abuse of the legal system in several ways. First, it
was a veiled attempt to secure through the courts regulatory
legislation that Congress had never enacted. This marked a
constitutionally inappropriate breach in the separation of powers.
Second, the litigation created a radical expansion of torts that
threatened to flood all industries with costly and spurious claims
from consumers. Finally, tobacco liability was seen as a cultural
failure: the refusal of individuals to take responsibility for their own
willful actions.148

Awareness of these concerns likely influenced the Supreme
Court’s decision to limit—but not entirely eliminate—avenues
for tobacco-related litigation.149 The Supreme Court was
147

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
148

BRANDT, supra note 2, at 353.
Though the Cipollone case barred failure to warn claims, the plurality
opinion held that state law fraud claims were not preempted by the FCLAA. This part
of the opinion was recently reaffirmed by a five-to-four margin in Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). The four dissenting Justices would have held that the
149
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understandably reluctant to place the courts at the center of a
broader cultural and political battle, and it sought to protect
the lower courts from the flood of litigation that would have
inevitably followed a ruling for the plaintiff in Cipollone.150
It is of course possible that the Supreme Court would
have built towards an aggressive preemption doctrine anyway.
Preemption is the subject of the “fiercest battle in products
liability litigation today,” with a variety of industries—
supported by a well-organized and well-funded tort reform
movement—pushing courts to declare that state tort law claims
against them are preempted by federal law.151 Although the
Supreme Court might have inevitably moved towards the same
position as a more conservative court took the bench, reading a
preemption clause broadly in cigarette context—which was
perhaps less controversial because of general skepticism about
the merits of tobacco litigation—clearly opened the door for the
Court to build upon Cipollone in subsequent decisions
unrelated to tobacco. Furthermore, as discussed below, the
Cipollone decision immediately opened the door for similar
preemption arguments in state courts and lower federal courts,
providing for rapid expansion of the preemption doctrine.
2. Post-Cipollone Decisions
“Almost immediately after Cipollone was decided, the
preemption theory permeated tort-claim cases in the lower
courts, which began to read Cipollone as compelling
preemption in a wide variety of circumstances.”152 Unlike in
Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court had not suggested
that its analysis was in any way limited to tobacco cases, and
the lower courts did not imply any such limitation. Lower
courts read Cipollone broadly for the proposition that the term
“requirement,” when used in a preemption clause, now
FCLAA also preempted all fraud-related claims against tobacco companies, which
would have granted the companies virtual immunity from all health-related tort suits.
Id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150
See Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health
Judicial Decision-Making Cannon, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 281, 286 (2002) (writing that
fear of a an overwhelming surge in tobacco-related cases led circuit courts to conclude
that the FCLAA preempted tort law claims).
151
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008).
152
Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the “Crazy Quilt” of Cipollone: A Divided
Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1478 (1997).
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included all common law tort claims. Courts used this
proposition to bar tort claims involving defective medical
devices,153 herbicides and insecticides,154 and auto safety.155
Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality decision in
Cipollone, later retreated from the position he articulated in
that case, finding himself on this short side of several
subsequent preemption decisions that either reaffirmed or
extended Cipollone.156 In Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal
Committee, which extended Cipollone by taking a similarly
broad view of implied preemption of common law claims,
Justice Stevens expressed his concern:
Under the preemption analysis the Court offers today . . . parties
injured by fraudulent representations to federal agencies would have
no remedy even if recognizing such a remedy would have no adverse
consequences upon the operation or integrity of the regulatory
process. I do not believe the reasons advanced in the Court’s opinion
support the conclusion that Congress intended such a harsh result.
Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)
(declining to infer that a federal statutory scheme that affords to
alternative means of seeking redress pre-empted traditional statelaw remedies).157

153

See., e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 1994)
(finding state tort law claims under the Medical Device Act preempted because “the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the word ‘requirement,’ in the context of an
express preemption provision, includes state law claims”); Stamps v. Collagen Corp.,
984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that collagen injection had caused
autoimmune disease on same grounds).
154
See, e.g., King v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st
Cir. 1993) (“The FIFRA [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act] language
prohibiting the states from ‘impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any requirements,’ 7
U.S.C. § 136v(b), is virtually indistinguishable from the state-imposed ‘requirement’
language that Cipollone held preempted the state common law tort claims based on
inadequate warning. FIFRA’s language, too, preempts the state law lack-of-warning
claims involved in this case.” (alterations in original)); Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F.
Supp. 61, 70 (D.N.H. 1993) (finding that plaintiff’s claim based on insecticide that
ignited without warning in his pocket was preempted by FIFRA).
155
See, e.g., Estate of Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 856 F. Supp. 574, 576-77
(D. Colo. 1994) (finding that after Cipollone, claims relating to the lack of an airbag are
expressly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, despite a
savings clause in the statute stating that “[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law”), aff’d on related grounds, 75 F.3d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir.
1996).
156
See Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353-355 (2001)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
157
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 355 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Buckman, the Court
held that plaintiffs’ state law claims based on injuries caused by orthopedic bone
screws were preempted because the screws had been approved by the FDA—even
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Of course, by citing all the way back to Silkwood, Justice
Stevens conveniently overlooked Cipollone. His own plurality
decision in Cipollone, essentially holding that the statutory
scheme in the FCLAA had “put a ceiling, as well as a floor, on
the common law obligations of manufacturers to communicate
the true dangers of their products to consumers,” had laid the
groundwork for the majority’s decision in Buckman and similar
cases.158 The gravamen of the Cipollone decision, after all, was
that the tobacco companies could not be required to warn
customers of known dangers, even if those dangers were much
more severe than those recognized on the FCLAA-required
warning labels. Justice Stevens has never directly argued that
Cipollone should be limited to its facts because it involved
cigarettes, but his retreat from its holding suggests a belief on
his part that tobacco products somehow present a unique case.
Justice Stevens’ reconsideration of his opinion, however,
has not stopped the Supreme Court from building on the
foundation of Cipollone. The most recent—and perhaps most
troubling—example is Riegel v Medtronic,159 where the Court
held that the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA
expressly preempted common law tort claims for medical
devices that had been approved by the FDA. At issue was a
coronary balloon catheter that had ruptured during its use in
angioplasty. Noting that the preemption clause included in the
MDA precluded contrary “requirements” from being applied
under state law, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority: “Absent
other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes
its common-law duties. As the plurality opinion said in
Cipollone, common-law liability is ‘premised on the existence of
a legal duty,’ and a tort judgment therefore establishes that the
defendant has violated a state-law obligation.”160
The absurdity of Riegel was that it read the preemption
provision in the MDA in a way that was clearly not intended by
its authors. Senator Ted Kennedy, the sole sponsor of the MDA
in the Senate, filed an amicus brief strenuously arguing that no
one in Congress ever considered that the preemption provision
in the MDA would preempt state tort claims. He wrote that the
term “requirements” was understood to apply only to state
though plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer had misled the FDA in its application
for approval. Id. at 343.
158
Daynard, supra note 150, at 286.
159
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
160
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
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regulations, and Congress did not even consider that the term
might apply to lawsuits until the Cipollone decision in 1992
(the MDA was passed in 1976). Senator Kennedy wrote (along
with Congressman Henry Waxman):
Congress was fully aware of widespread tort law suits over medical
devices, yet there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest an
intent [to] preempt such suits. At the time the MDA was enacted,
Congress did not understand the term “requirement” to include state
tort law verdicts. . . . If Congress had intended to preempt state tort
law suits, it would have explicitly done so. Taking into account the
plain language of the MDA preemption provision, the absence of any
indication in the legislative history that Congress even considered
the possibility that the provision would preempt state tort suits, the
presumption against preemption, and the legislative purpose of the
MDA, it is plain that the “requirements” preempted under the
statute do not include state tort law suits.161

The majority neatly dismissed this argument, writing that the
preemption of state tort claims “is exactly what [the MDA
preemption clause] does by its terms.”162 Therefore, because the
meaning of the statute was so clear, the intent of Congress
need not even be considered. Though this reasoning is
spectacularly
circular—because
we
read
the
term
“requirements” to include tort claims, the term is not
ambiguous—it is surely consistent with Cipollone.
3. Public Health Impact
Immunity from tort litigation—which is effectively what
federal preemption provides—removes a major incentive for
manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible or to
alert consumers to newly-discovered dangers. The public health
implications of this doctrine are likely to be significant.
Consider, for example, the Riegel case itself and the regulation
of medical devices. As David Vladeck has explained, the MDA
approval process, while important, does not provide
manufacturers with any meaningful incentives to alert
consumers of new dangers that are discovered after the product
is on the market. Vladeck writes:
161

Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 21, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179).
162
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008-09. Legislation has been introduced in both
houses of Congress to overrule Riegel. Thus far, the legislation has not been brought up
for a vote. See Gregory D. Curfman et al., The Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1550, 1551 (2009).
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[P]remarket approval is a one-time licensing decision that is based
on whether the device’s sponsor has shown a “reasonable assurance”
of safety. There is no provision in the MDA for devices to be
periodically re-certified by the FDA. Medical devices are often
approved on the basis of a single clinical trial, often involving very
small numbers of patients . . . . Once on the market, the FDA
engages in only limited surveillance . . . .
The FDA’s track record demonstrates the agency’s woeful inability to
single-handedly protect the American people against defective and
dangerous medical devices. Just in the past few years, we have seen
massive recalls of defibrillators, pacemakers, heart valves, hip and
knee prostheses, and heart pumps — all of which have exacted a
terrible toll on the patients who have had them implanted in their
bodies, and who often face the daunting prospect of explanation and
replacement surgery. [If premarket approval preempts tort
claims] . . . all of these people would be left without any remedy at
all. Premarket approval is an important process intended to put an
end to the marketing of devices without meaningful testing and with
no assurance of safety. But while the [premarket approval] process
provides minimum safeguards, it cannot replace the continuous and
comprehensive safety incentives, information disclosure, and victim
compensation that tort law has traditionally provided.163

This is especially troublesome when one considers that “the
data supporting a [premarket approval] application are
compiled by the device manufacturer and are often
unreliable.”164
Beyond medical devices, Cipollone, as suggested above,
led to federal court decisions preempting state tort law claims
in a variety of other contexts. The public health implications of
these decisions are exceedingly difficult to track, and in some
instances the Supreme Court later held that lower courts had
extended Cipollone too far.165 It is clear, however, that even if
the Cipollone decision was based in part on the unique context
and pressures of tobacco litigation, it armed defendants in a
variety of other industries with a powerful (and often
163

DAVID C. VLADECK, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW & POLICY,
THE EMERGING THREAT OF REGULATORY PREEMPTION 6-8 (2008) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33
PEPP. L. REV. 95, 126-30 (2005). Another concern is that “agency capture” may limit the
effectiveness of regulatory oversight. See, e.g., VLADECK, THE EMERGING THREAT OF
REGULATORY PREEMPTION, supra, at 16.
164
Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 17-18, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) (citing an FDA Inspector
General report revealing “serious deficiencies . . . in the clinical data submitted as part
of pre-market applications”) (alteration in original).
165
See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005)
(holding that state law claims regarding negligent manufacturing and breach of
warranty with respect to pesticides were not preempted by FIFRA).
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successful) new weapon to use in defeating products liability
actions and other state tort law claims. Justice Ginsburg, the
sole dissenter in Riegel, was likely correct when she wrote:
“[R]egardless of the strength of a plaintiff’s case, suits will be
barred ab initio. The constriction of state authority ordered
today was not mandated by Congress and is at odds with the
MDA’s central purpose: to protect consumer safety.”166 The same
can be said of the other cases that followed in Cipollone’s
wake.167
D.

Class Certification

Cipollone weakened tobacco litigation, but it did not end
it. Cipollone held that post-1965 failure to warn cases were
preempted, but the plurality decision left a window open for
fraud and misrepresentation claims, as well as pre-1965 failure
to warn actions. Moreover, the documents exposed in Cipollone
and in the subsequent investigations of the tobacco industry by
state attorneys general provided the means by which to
establish the industry’s fraud. Individual litigation, however,
remained extraordinarily expensive and risky, due to the
industry’s aggressive litigation tactics. In the mid-1990s, the
use of class action litigation appeared to be a promising avenue
by which to neutralize the industry’s financial advantages and
aggregate “individual claims for harm into one massive tort
challenge to the industry.”168 Cases in the 1980s had shown the
class action to be a powerful tool that could address serious

166

128 S. Ct. at 1020 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
In an important recent case, the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine found
that tort claims against the pharmaceutical industry were not preempted by federal
law. 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009). Unlike Cipollone and Reigel, Wyeth did not involve an issue
of express preemption. The plaintiffs had argued that preemption should be implied
because state tort law interfered with the ability of the FDA to exercise its control over
the pharmaceutical industry. This argument was rejected six-to-three by the court. Id.
at 1200 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the
FDCA’s 70-year history. But despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption
provision for medical devices, Congress has not enacted such a provision for
prescription drugs.” (citation omitted)). Thus, Wyeth did not in any way overrule or
limit Cipollone and its progeny, though it did put some limits on the doctrine of implied
preemption.
168
Rabin, Third Wave, supra note 133, at 179. Class actions also had the
potential to “reduce the focus on individual behavior and diagnosis.” BRANDT, supra
note 2, at 405.
167
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public health threats such as DES, the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine contraceptive, Agent Orange, and asbestos.169
Despite the promise of class action litigation, tobaccorelated class actions ultimately failed, and it is now generally
agreed that “class action litigation has largely fallen by the
wayside as a means of determining collective liability for
victims of mass products torts.”170 Although the collapse of the
class action is not solely due to the impact of tobacco litigation,
tobacco cases appear to have sealed the fate of the mass tort
class action. At least when it comes to health-related cases, the
consensus is that “the mass tort class action is as dead as a
doornail.”171
Two different issues have made it difficult for plaintiffs
in tobacco-related cases to achieve class certification. The first
is the question of “commonality.”172 In tobacco cases—as in
other health-related cases—individual issues play a significant
role. Questions about whether the plaintiffs relied on the
tobacco companies’ misstatements or whether their injuries
were caused by smoking are fact-specific inquiries where the
answers likely vary from person to person. For such questions,
class action certification may not be appropriate. This problem
can be mitigated, however, by seeking issue certification on

169

Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 382 (2005). If most injured
individuals lack either the impetus (due to widely dispersed harm) or the resources to
bring individual lawsuits, defendants will be “under-deterred.” The class action held
the promise of remedying this problem while also promoting greater efficiency in the
court system:
[T]he class action deters defendants from externalizing the costs of their
actions by causing widespread, but individually minimal harm. Potential
defendants know that they will be held accountable for such harm in both
monetary and reputational terms, and they therefore have a greater
incentive to avoid engaging in harmful activities. This deterrence function
ultimately benefits consumers and courts alike, as greater deterrence leads to
fewer future injuries and future lawsuits.
Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 180910 (2000) (citation omitted).
170
Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement
in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 895 (2005).
171
Gilles, supra note 169, at 388.
172
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), class action certification is
appropriate only when “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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questions shared by the entire class, while leaving individual
issues to be resolved later.173
The second issue is one of magnitude. Courts have been
reluctant to allow certification for extremely large classes,
particularly in situations where a verdict for the plaintiff class
could potentially bankrupt the defendants. Given the number
of current and former smokers, tobacco-related class actions
inevitably present this issue. The concern about magnitude
was famously outlined by Judge Richard Posner in In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc.174 In Rhone-Poulenc, a case involving a
plaintiff class of hemophiliacs who had been exposed to the
AIDS virus, Judge Posner advanced the novel argument
(indeed, one that the defendant had not raised until oral
argument) that high-stakes class actions unfairly pressure
defendants to either settle or “stake their companies on the
outcome of a single jury trial.”175 He argued that class action
treatment might be appropriate where “individual suits are
infeasible because the claim of each class member is tiny
relative to the expense of litigation,” but he found that “[t]hat
plainly is not the situation here.”176
Courts have not always distinguished between these
two concerns when denying class certification in tobaccorelated cases, but the concern about class size and potential
unfairness to the defendants has likely played the more
173

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate,
an action may be maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
174
51 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class
Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1481 (2005) (“The Rhone-Poulenc
decision has been vastly influential in all aspects of class action jurisprudence. Its ‘free
market’ attitude toward the maturation of mass torts through repetitive trials in
multiple jurisdictions has held sway across the country . . . .” (citations omitted)).
175
51 F.3d. at 1299. Although Judge Posner advanced other reasons for
decertifying the class, this concern appeared to be his “core reason.” Gilles, supra note
169, at 386.
176
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. This reasoning leads to the odd result that
in life-and-death cases, where a group of plaintiffs have been killed or seriously injured
by the defendant, class action treatment is almost never appropriate. On the other
hand, class actions can be used for cases with trivial damages such as lawsuits
involving overpriced cosmetics or “junk faxes.” See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 243 Fed. Appx. 311, 312 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming certification of class
action and approval of final settlement in cosmetics-related antitrust case); CE Design
v. Beaty Constr., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5842 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2009) (certifying
class action in “junk faxes” case). This is a perverse result given that, as several
commentators have noted, it is attorneys who are most likely to benefit from class
action settlements where the plaintiffs have little stake in the matter. By contrast, in
health-related cases, class actions present the opportunity for meaningful redress for
plaintiffs.
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significant (though often unrecognized) role. In Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., a class action brought on behalf of
addicted smokers, this concern was clearly central to the
court’s decision.177 Basing their case on newly revealed evidence
that tobacco companies had been manipulating nicotine levels
in cigarettes in order to create and sustain addiction, the
plaintiffs focused their lawsuit on the tobacco companies’ fraud,
rather than on the health effects of smoking.178 In this way, they
hoped to avoid some of the “commonality” questions that had
doomed previous attempts at class actions. Although the
district court certified the class (with respect to whether the
industry had defrauded the plaintiffs and whether punitive
damages were warranted), the Fifth Circuit reversed, relying
heavily on Rhone-Poulenc.179 Characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim
as a “novel and wholly untested theory,” the Fifth Circuit wrote
that the case presented unique concerns:
[C]lass [action] certification creates insurmountable pressure on
defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not . . . . These
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.
The traditional concern over the rights of defendants in mass tort
class actions is magnified in the instant case. . . . This is because
certification of an immature tort results in a higher than normal risk
that the class action may not be superior to individual
adjudication.180

This deference for “the rights of defendants” does not
appear anywhere in Rule 23. Nonetheless, there is no reason
not to take the Fifth Circuit’s statements at face value when it
expressed its concern that class action certification might
unfairly force the tobacco industry to either settle (regardless of
meritorious defenses it might have) or “roll the dice” on one
massive trial. The stakes involved were indeed huge.181 The
plaintiffs were a class of roughly 40 million people in what was
177

See 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
See Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 333 (2001) [hereinafter Rabin, Tentative Assessment].
179
Castano, 84 F.3d at 746, 748.
180
Id. at 737, 746-47 (footnote omitted). For a rebuttal to the charge of
“judicial blackmail,” see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
181
See Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on
Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 484 (2001) (“Had the plaintiffs succeeded in
preserving class certification in Castano . . . the availability of the class device itself
would have been a generating factor behind litigation of almost unimaginable
dimensions.”).
178
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quite possibly “the largest class action ever attempted in
federal court.”182 Even without seeking health-related damages,
the economic damages and punitive damages could plausibly
have bankrupted the tobacco industry. Given the
circumstances, it is not at all surprising that the Fifth Circuit
was reluctant to allow a “winner-takes-all shootout at the OK
Corral.”183
Judge Posner, as noted above, had suggested in RhonePoulenc that individual treatment might be appropriate where
“individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”184 The Fifth
Circuit determined that Castano was not such a case, but its
conclusion that “individual suits are feasible” proved to be
mistaken.185 In fact, individual plaintiffs have not been able to
afford lawsuits based on Castano’s addiction-focused theory.
The Castano plaintiffs’ attorneys’ threat that they would
“inundate the courts with individual claims if class certification
is denied” was revealed to be idle bluster.186 Thus, in retrospect,
Castano’s reliance on Rhone-Poulenc was arguably misplaced.
Nonetheless, by loosening the conditions under which RhonePoulenc’s “blackmail” theory would be applied, the Fifth Circuit
made it easier for subsequent cases to further unmoor RhonePoulenc’s holding from Judge Posner’s articulated limitations.
Myriam Gilles writes:
The Castano decertification was followed, in quick succession, by the
Sixth Circuit’s decertification of a class involving penile implants,
the Ninth Circuit’s decertification of medical products liability
classes, and the Third Circuit’s decertification of an asbestos class.
Finally, the Supreme Court got into the act [in Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)], rejecting a prepackaged settlement
deal in which plaintiffs and defendants agreed to certify an asbestos
class for settlement purposes only. Once again, the refusal to certify
182

Castano, 84 F.3d at 737; Rabin, Tentative Assessment, supra note 178, at

333.
183

Gilles, supra note 169, at 387.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
185
Castano, 84 F.3d at 748. Thus, Castano may have been the unusual case
where the individual damages were not significant enough to support individual
lawsuits, but class certification created a case so large it could have destroyed the
industry.
186
Id. Following the decertification of Castano, some individual lawsuits
against the tobacco industry have succeeded, but the successful claims have not been
based upon the addiction-based theory put forward in Castano. See Robert L. Rabin,
Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1721, 1742-44 (2008) (surveying recent individual lawsuits against the tobacco
industry).
184
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was driven, in part, by concerns with “fairness” to the defendants,
given the coercive settlement power of a certified class proceeding.187

More recent cases have similarly relied on Castano to
deny class certification in lawsuits involving allegedly defective
pharmaceuticals,188 exposure to radiation,189 welding fumes,190
and toxic chemical leaks.191 In most of these cases (with the
exception of the asbestos cases), the discrepancy in power
between the parties and/or the stakes involved would not have
exerted undue pressure on the defendants to either settle the
case or risk bankruptcy. Thus, the reasoning behind RhonePoulenc and Castano was inapplicable. Nonetheless, cases
following Castano have ignored the context of the case and
focused instead on its holding or its ancillary concerns about
commonality.
Several subsequent tobacco cases have followed
Castano, thus setting additional precedents making class
action certification more difficult in health-related cases.
Overreaching by plaintiffs’ attorneys—as in the recent case of
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., which sought $800
billion in damages for a massive class consisting of all “light”
cigarette smokers since 1971—has not helped.192 In the notable
Engle case in Florida, a Miami jury awarded a class of Florida
smokers $145 billion in punitive damages against the tobacco
industry.193 Though the Florida Supreme Court later decertified
the class on “commonality” grounds,194 it is likely that the
court’s decision was also due in part to astonishment at the size
of the jury verdict and concern about unfairness to the tobacco

187

Gilles, supra note 169, at 387-88 (citations omitted).
Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 190-91 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
189
Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 237 F.R.D. 581, 602-05 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
190
In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
191
Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604-05 (5th Cir.
2006). In all, Castano has been cited by more than 600 cases. Some of these have
focused on Castano’s remarkably broad statement that “a fraud class action cannot be
certified when individual reliance will be an issue.” Castano, 84 F.3d at 745.
192
See 522 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2008). In McLaughlin, District Judge Jack
Weinstein, who had helped originate the mass tort class action with his decision in In
re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 857-58 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), granted class certification before being reversed by the Second Circuit. Schwab
v. Philip Morris USA, 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
193
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006).
194
Id. at 1268 (writing that “individualized issues such as legal causation,
comparative fault, and damages predominate”).
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companies.195 The suspicion that the Florida Supreme Court
was more troubled by the outcome than the procedure is
heightened by the fact that the court had previously refused
the defendants’ request to decertify the class before the trial.
In leading the decline of the class action in healthrelated cases, tobacco cases have been joined by asbestos cases.
With respect to class action certification, asbestos cases share
the salient characteristics of tobacco litigation: extremely large
numbers of potential plaintiffs who present widely varied
medical conditions and histories of exposure. In Amchem, the
Supreme Court decertified a settlement class action in an
asbestos case, noting the same problems highlighted in
Castano. It highlighted the massive size of the proposed class,
and it emphasized that courts must exercise caution when
“individual stakes are high and disparities among class
members great.”196 This was followed by the rejection of an
asbestos-related class action settlement two years later in Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., where the Court again signaled its
distaste for the use of class action settlements to resolve mass
tort cases.197
Thus, it was perhaps not the “tobacco-ness” of the
tobacco cases that led to their decertification, but rather a set
of characteristics common to both tobacco and asbestos
litigation. Together, these two types of cases have created
precedents in nearly every circuit that can be seized upon to
decertify mass tort class actions. These cases have precipitated
the collapse of the class action as a public health tool, even
though the unusual features of tobacco and asbestos litigation
are absent in many other public health contexts.
E.

Punitive Damages

Because tobacco companies have historically been so
successful in defending against liability, tobacco-related cases
contributed nothing to the law of punitive damages until
recently. Indeed, it was not until 2005, in Henley v. Philip
Morris, that a tobacco industry defendant actually made a
payment of punitive damages to a plaintiff in a personal injury
195

Id. at 1265 n.8 (“We also conclude that the punitive damages award was
clearly excessive . . . . [T]he award would result in an unlawful crippling of the
defendant companies.”).
196
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25 (1997).
197
527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999).
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lawsuit.198 Over the last ten years, however, the tobacco
companies have begun to face more adverse judgments that
have included awards of punitive damages. In keeping with
their reputation as tenacious litigators, the tobacco companies
have consistently pursued every possible avenue to appeal
these verdicts and delay paying claims.199 This strategy—
though not always successful in vacating damages awards—
has often worked (as it did in Henley) to significantly reduce
the amount of punitive damages.200 It has also meant that
tobacco cases are more frequently the subject of precedentmaking decisions involving punitive damages awards—
particularly in cases interpreting the Supreme Court’s rapidlyshifting Due Process jurisprudence on the topic.
The use of tobacco-related cases to set new precedents
can have unintended consequences that severely limit the
availability of punitive damages for subsequent litigants. For
example, in Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., the
Eighth Circuit slashed an Arkansas jury’s award of punitive
damages by two-thirds, finding that a 1:1 ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages was appropriate.201 The
court, astoundingly, concluded that despite clear evidence that
American Tobacco (a predecessor company to Brown &
Williamson) “actively misled consumers about the health risks
associated with smoking,” there was “no evidence that anyone
at American Tobacco intended to victimize its customers.”202 It
is easy to see how all sorts of defendants—in other public
health contexts and beyond—could subsequently argue that
punitive damages greater than a 1:1 ratio were not warranted
198

Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38-39 (Ct. App. 2004),
appeal dismissed, 97 P.3d 814 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).
199
The Henley case demonstrates the resources the tobacco industry has been
willing to invest in appealing adverse verdicts. In 1999, a San Francisco jury awarded
Patricia Henley $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive
damages. It was not until six years later that Philip Morris exhausted its appeals and
was forced to pay. By that time, the case had made two trips to the California Supreme
Court and the punitive damages awards had been slashed from $50 million to $9
million. See Myron Levin, High Court Turns Away Philip Morris, L.A. TIMES, March
22, 2005, at C1.
200
See, e.g., Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775 (Ct. App.
2008) (overturning award of $28 billion in punitive damages); Boeken v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638 (Ct. App. 2005) (reducing punitive damages award from $3
billion to $50 million); Philip Morris, Inc. v. French, 897 So. 2d 480, 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (noting that in response to Philip Morris’ motion, the trial judge had
reduced the award of damages from $5.5 million to $500,000).
201
394 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2005).
202
Id.
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because their conduct, however egregious, paled in comparison
to the actions of the tobacco companies.203
Though Boerner and cases like it can be characterized
as (perhaps dubious) applications of the Supreme Court’s Due
Process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s decision in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams unquestionably broke new ground.204
This decision—which has been roundly criticized by
commentators as unintelligible205—is likely to have a significant
impact on future public health litigation.
1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams
Williams involved a suit by the estate of Oregon
resident Jesse Williams, a longtime smoker of Marlboro
cigarettes who began smoking in the 1950s and died of
smoking-related lung cancer in 1997. The jury found for the
plaintiff on claims of negligence and fraud. On the fraud claim,
the jury awarded compensatory damages of $821,000 and
punitive damages of $79.5 million.206 After the award was
affirmed for a second time by the Oregon Supreme Court,207
Philip Morris appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The tobacco
company was optimistic that the Supreme Court would apply
its holdings in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.

203

See Anna Van Duzer, Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.: The
Eighth Circuit Misapplied the Second Gore Guidepost to Erroneously Decide a Punitive
Damages Award Was Excessive, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 416, 440 (2006) (writing
that the Boerner decision was a misapplication of both Supreme Court and Eighth
Circuit precedent, and that “by imposing a ratio of approximately 1:1 in Boerner
without identifying particular facts from the case that supported doing so, the court
essentially locked in a 1:1 ratio for all future cases involving large compensatory
awards”).
204
549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
205
See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of
Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 343, 359 (2008) (“I have read this passage scores of times. I have also taught it
to hundreds of students in Remedies courses so far. I confess, however, to being truly
perplexed as to how the Court envisions the jury complying with this requirement.”);
Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG.
9, 30 (2007) (“Philip Morris instructs courts that it is permissible to consider harm to
other victims in determining reprehensibility, but impermissible to actually increase
an award in an effort to punish the defendant for the harms inflicted on others. It is a
distinction that many will find confusing, as the dissenting opinions noted.”).
206
Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The
jury awarded no punitive damages on the negligence claim (finding that Williams was
fifty percent at fault); the $79.5 million in punitive damages was awarded on the fraud
claim. The compensatory damages were later reduced by the trial judge. Id.
207
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165 (Or. 2006).
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Campbell208 and BMW of North America v. Gore209 to find that a
nearly 100:1 ratio between punitive damages and
compensatory damages (on the fraud claim) was
unconstitutionally excessive. Instead, in a 5-4 decision written
by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court avoided the question of
excessiveness, finding alternate grounds on which to remand
the case to the Oregon Supreme Court.210
The Court held that “the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to
punish a defendant for [an] injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties . . . those who are, essentially, strangers to the
litigation.”211 This holding, as Justice Breyer acknowledged, was
a new interpretation of the Due Process Clause.212 It was also
an interpretation likely to confuse state courts, as Justice
Breyer’s opinion further explained that evidence of harm to
nonparties could be introduced in order to show that the
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “reprehensible” to justify
an award of punitive damages. In dissent, Justice Stevens
outlined the problem:
[T]he majority relies on a distinction between taking third-party
harm into account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct—which is permitted—and doing so in order to

208

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
210
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357-58 (2007). On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court declined to reduce or reconsider the damages
award, finding that there had been independent state law grounds for rejecting the
jury instruction requested by Philip Morris. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d
1255, 1260 (Or. 2008), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008). This decision, arguably a
“provocation to the United States Supreme Court,” led the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari again, and in December 2008, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the
case for the third time. Anthony J. Sebok, The Unusual Story of Williams v. Philip
Morris, and Its Third Trip to the Supreme Court—Including Some Predictions About
What the Court Will Do This Time, FINDLAW, Dec. 16, 2008, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20081216.html. However, on March 31, 2009, the
Supreme Court unexpectedly dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
211
Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
212
Id. at 356-57 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury may not
punish for the harm caused by others. But we do so hold now.”). As Michael Rustad
notes, the conclusion of Williams appears to run contrary to the Court’s previous
statement in BMW v. Gore that “evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in
prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide
relevant support for an argument that strong medicine is required to cure the
defendant’s disrespect for the law.” Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme Court and Me:
Trapped in Time with Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L. J. 783, 820 (2008) (quoting
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)).
209
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punish the defendant “directly”—which is forbidden. This nuance
eludes me.213

The Williams decision has been characterized as just
another step in the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to use the
Due Process Clause to place both procedural and substantive
limits on awards of punitive damages. To some extent, that is
unquestionably true. Previous cases had suggested that the
Court’s conception of damages was based on a model of “one-onone torts” that discounted broader social or deterrence-based
goals that of punitive damages could serve. Williams appears
to extend that approach, taking “further steps in limiting the
remedial goals punitive damages could serve” with its narrow
focus on punishment for the particular facts of the given case.214
But were there other factors—factors unique to the tobaccorelated context of the case—that caused the Court to move its
punitive damages jurisprudence in this particular direction?
There are several reasons why the convoluted result of
Williams may have been attributable to the fact that the case
involved a smoking-related claim. First, the issue of
assumption of risk, which has “hovered like a storm cloud over
every smoker’s claim against the tobacco companies,”215 seems
to have played a particularly significant role. Keith Hylton
more specifically refers to the issue in Williams as one of
“heterogeneity.”216 In short, the majority seemed particularly
concerned that punishing Philip Morris for harm caused to
other, non-plaintiff smokers would be unfair to Philip Morris
because those other cases may have been significantly different
(heterogeneous) from this one. Smoking-related cases raise
these heterogeneity issues in abundance, but assumption of
risk seems to have been of particular concern to the Court.
Would the other, nonparty smokers have chosen to smoke
anyway with full knowledge of the dangers? Should they be
assigned some portion of the fault for continuing to smoke after
the dangers of smoking were known? Justice Breyer
highlighted this concern in his decision, writing:
213

Williams, 549 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Allen, supra note 205, at 365; see Rustad, supra note 212, at 803-04 (“The
Court’s latest decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams was the last rites, if not the
obituary, for the crimtort paradigm. The Court’s punitive damages cases, taken as a
whole, are a step backward into the jurisprudence of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.” (citations omitted)).
215
Robert L. Rabin, Review Essay, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 475, 493 (1991).
216
Hylton, supra note 205, at 19.
214
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[A] defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty
victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge, by showing,
for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not
entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was
dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to the
contrary.217

Yet, at least in terms of public health cases, tobaccorelated cases are particularly unusual in the degree to which
they raise the issue of assumption of risk. In many (though not
all) public health cases, it would be absurd to argue that the
plaintiff had voluntarily chosen to encounter the risk. For
example, imagine a lawsuit involving a company that had
secretly polluted the local water supply, causing hundreds of
people to become sick. In such a case, there could be no
argument that anyone had chosen to risk illness (unlike the
argument that many people choose to smoke, knowing the
risks). In such a case, “[c]omplete deterrence of the offender’s
conduct is the socially appropriate goal . . . [and] there is no
reason on deterrence grounds to limit aggregation [i.e., basing
punitive damages in part on harm caused to non-parties]
because of the problem of claim heterogeneity.”218 Thus, the fact
that Williams was a smoking-related case may have led the
Supreme Court to extend Due Process limitations on punitive
damages, even though the concern raised by Philip Morris is
inapplicable to a wide variety of other contexts.219
Secondly, the problem identified by Philip Morris in its
appeal—that it was being unfairly punished for acts directed to
non-parties in the litigation—is a much more acute issue in
tobacco cases than in other types of litigation. If juries actually
tried to punish Philip Morris for similar harms suffered by nonparties, the results would be astronomical awards—perhaps
along the lines of the $145 billion punitive damages verdict in
Engle. If Philip Morris’s conduct is generically described as
defrauding smokers by lying about the harmfulness of
cigarettes, there are literally millions of Oregonians who would
have claims similar to Williams’s. The unparalleled scope of
217

Williams, 549 U.S. at 353-54.
Hylton, supra note 205, at 20.
219
As Hylton writes, the argument about heterogeneity would have been
“preposterous on its face” if made by the defendant in State Farm. Id. at 21. State
Farm could not have argued that “there were some victims of bad faith conduct in the
insurance market that did not mind being victimized in this way at all.” Id. Yet the
rule in Williams will operate to shield defendants like State Farm from higher punitive
damages in the future.
218
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Philip Morris’s fraud (and that of the other tobacco companies)
created the possibility for massive punitive damages verdicts
that would run counter to the Supreme Court’s ongoing efforts
to rein in such awards as well as its previously-expressed
concern (or deference to Congress’s concern) for the tobacco
industry’s important role in the national economy.220 It seems
that the plaintiff’s attorneys were put in a bind—in order to
argue that it was appropriate to exceed a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages in this case, they
had to emphasize the fact that Philip Morris had “engaged in
one of the longest running, most profitable, and deadliest
frauds in the annals of American commerce.”221 By emphasizing
the scope of the fraud, however, they may have inadvertently
highlighted the potential for nearly limitless punitive damages
awards in the future.
The Supreme Court’s attempt to finesse these two
competing concerns—recognizing the reprehensibility of the
tobacco industry’s conduct while at the same time protecting it
from crippling punitive damages awards—may explain the
Court’s decision to rule on grounds that allowed it to dodge the
question of the single-digit ratio. The role of Justice Breyer
may have been particularly significant. Justice Breyer has
been a reliable vote to constrain the scope of punitive damages.
He was in the majority in State Farm, Gore, Cooper
Industries,222 and other cases supporting Due Process limits on
punitive damages. At the same time, he has consistently been
in the dissent on cases that sought to limit regulation of the
tobacco industry, including Brown & Williamson and Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. (Breyer was not on the Court when it
decided Cipollone.) In particular, Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Brown & Williamson went out of its way to highlight in detail
the tobacco industry’s history of deception regarding the
addictiveness of nicotine.223 It seems that Justice Breyer was
reluctant to write a decision that would minimize the severity
of the tobacco industry’s conduct, and yet he also had serious
overarching concerns about the role of unconstrained punitive
damages. The result was a decision in Williams that not only
avoided addressing how Philip Morris’s conduct fit into State
220

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 138-39 (2000).
Brief for Respondent at 1, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346
(2007) (No. 05-1256).
222
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001).
223
529 U.S. at 172-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221
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Farm’s suggested guideposts for punitive damages, but it also
(unlike previous punitive damages decisions) studiously
avoided any detailed discussion of the facts of the case.224 The
decision reads more like a theoretical discussion that even
avoids applying its holding to the facts of the case. Nowhere in
the decision does Justice Breyer specifically say whether the
jury instruction proposed by Philip Morris (which had been
rejected) should have been accepted or what a proper jury
instruction might look like.225 Instead, it merely provided the
vague directive that states must “provide some form of
protection” to ensure that punitive damages would not be used
to punish for harm to non-parties.226
2. Public Health Impact
With regard to punitive damages, the impact of tobaccorelated cases, and Williams in particular, is a bit harder to
predict. As long as the tobacco-related cases remain at the
forefront of the justices’ minds, it is likely that at least some
(and, for now, a majority) of the justices will decline to impose a
hard-and-fast single-digit ratio limit on punitive damages. At
the same time, a majority of the justices continue to have
intellectual problems with punitive damages awards that they
view as unpredictable, unconstrained, and unconstitutionally
unfair. For this reason, there may be more decisions like
Williams that attempt to split the difference but instead end up
causing more confusion.
Is this result better or worse than a hard-and-fast rule
limiting punitive damages? In part, that will depend on how
lower courts choose to apply Williams. It is certainly possible,
however, that Williams provides the more problematic rule
from a public health perspective. Indeed, attorneys for
corporate defendants are optimistic that Williams may not only
reduce punitive damages awards, but it may eliminate them
224

The entire discussion of the facts of the case is limited to three brief
sentences. Williams, 549 U.S. at 349-50; see Heather R. Klaasen, Punishment
Defanged: How the United States Supreme Court has Undermined the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Punitive Damages [Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(2007)], 47 WASHBURN L.J. 551, 569 (2008) (“Even though the Court’s decisions in
Browning-Ferris, Haslip, TXO, Cooper Industries, Gore, and Campbell included
extensive factual analysis, the Court ignored the substantive facts of Philip Morris.”).
225
See 549 U.S. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court ventures no
opinion on the propriety of the charge proposed by Philip Morris, though Philip Morris
preserved no other objection to the trial proceedings.”).
226
Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
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altogether. As one attorney who represents both Ford and WalMart put it, the ruling that punitive damages cannot be used to
punish defendants for harm to non-parties “gives defendants
not only the ability to challenge punitive[] [damages] as
excessive but an avenue to eliminate or prevent such a verdict
in the first place.”227 Early applications of Williams support this
prediction. In Moody v. Ford Motor Co., for example, a U.S.
District Court granted Ford’s motion for a new trial in a case
involving a Ford Explorer that rolled over on the highway.228
The driver died of asphyxia when the roof of the Explorer
collapsed and prevented him from breathing. In granting the
motion for a new trial, the judge suggested that after Williams,
Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute might be facially
unconstitutional. The statute in question provided that
punitive damages could be awarded only if the plaintiff has
established that the defendant “has been guilty of reckless
disregard for the rights of others.”229 Judge Eagan wrote:
The reckless disregard standard under Oklahoma law [Okla. Stat.
tit. 23, § 9.1] is based on harm to others, not just harm to the
plaintiff. . . . Under Philip Morris, Ford has a due process right to
ensure that the jury uses punitive damages to punish it for harm
suffered by plaintiff only, not all third parties that may have been
injured in a rollover accident. The Court would consider a limiting
instruction based on Philip Morris, but there is a strong possibility
that this would be contrary to the legislative intent and may void
any award of punitive damages under section 9.1.230

227

Margaret Cronin Fisk, Punitive Damages Shrink as Court Reins in
Lawyers, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Jan. 21, 2008 (quoting Ted Boutrous of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher).
228
506 F. Supp. 2d 823, 849, 851 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
229
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2008).
230
Moody, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 849 n.14. Indeed cases in several states suggest
that the only legitimate function of punitive damages is a public purpose, focused on
the impact that the misconduct has had on the public generally. See, e.g., Fabiano v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div. 2008) (“A claim for punitive
damages may, of course, be rooted in personal injury, but for such a claim to succeed
the injury must be shown to be emblematic of much more than individually sustained
wrong. It must be shown to reflect pervasive and grave misconduct affecting the public
generally, to, in a sense, merge with a serious public grievance, and thus merit
punitive, indeed quasi-criminal sanction.” (citations omitted)) (reversing award of
punitive damages in smoking-related cases because public purpose of punishing
tobacco industry misconduct had already been served by the payment provision of the
Master Settlement Agreement); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343
(Ohio 1994) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to
punish and deter certain conduct.”). Williams provides an argument for eliminating all
punitive damages awards in these states.
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Even without completely barring awards of punitive
damages, the Williams rule may prove to be more problematic
than a hard-and-fast ratio limiting punitive damages. A ratio
limit may be problematic in certain cases, particularly cases
where compensatory damages are low or the misconduct was
exceedingly profitable or hard to detect.231 The Williams
holding, however, more directly weakens the ability of punitive
damages to act as an effective deterrent in all mass tort cases,232
thereby both jeopardizing public health and undercutting a
major argument that litigation has an appropriate role to play
in the public health context. Michael Rustad explains:
The Court’s “other bad acts” rule of evidence will have the most
impact in mass product liability cases where a single defect or failure
to warn will result in a portfolio of claims. If this rule had been
applicable in the Ford Pinto cases, evidence of other fatalities
associated with crash-induced fuel leakage would have been
admissible for the purposes of determining reprehensibility, but
would not have been admissible to set the punitive damages
award. . . . [C]orporate wrongdoers will be tempted to perform a
socially harmful cost-benefit analysis deciding that it is profitable to
risk the consuming public, especially where the risk of detection is
low.233

Thus, in mass tort cases, if juries are not allowed to consider
the impact on non-parties when fashioning punitive damages
awards, the defendants will almost by definition be underdeterred (because not nearly all of those harmed by the conduct
will bring their own lawsuits).234 Adding to this problem is the
231

See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.) (“If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when
he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times
he gets away.”); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“When an injurer has a chance
of escaping liability, the proper level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found
liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found
liable.”).
232
See Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-Worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of
Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 459, 494 (2008).
233
Id. at 497, 500. In upholding the amount of a punitive damages award in
one of the Ford Pinto cases, the California Appeals Court wrote that “[u]nlike malicious
conduct directed towards a single specific individual, Ford’s tortious conduct
endangered the lives of thousands of Pinto purchasers.” Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (Ct. App. 1981). After Williams, this appears to be an invalid
basis for upholding the size of a punitive damages award.
234
See Hylton, supra note 205, at 31 (“[T]he only sturdy reason that can be
discerned for the Court’s decision [in Williams] is the notion that every person not
before the court is capable of bringing his own lawsuit and having it decided on the
basis of the issues in his case. While this sounds fine in theory, it is far from what
happens in real life. The truth is that relatively few people bring lawsuits.”); Klaasen,
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fact that companies with deep pockets—having learned from
the model of the tobacco industry—can deter lawsuits by
making any suit against the company an extremely expensive
(and therefore risky) endeavor.235 Without the potential for
punitive damages serving as an effective deterrent, there is
little doubt that some companies will choose to endanger the
public’s health in their pursuit of profit.236
IV.

CONCLUSION

The legal developments catalyzed by tobacco decisions—
an expansive preemption doctrine, limits on class certification,
and constraints on punitive damages—have severely weakened
the ability of personal injury litigation to effectively deter
corporate misconduct and protect public health. On the
regulatory side, legal decisions shielding the tobacco industry
from regulation have opened the door to weakening other
important public health regulatory regimes.
In many of the cases discussed above, the unusual
context of tobacco litigation—a huge volume of cases (and
potential cases) at the intersection of intense cultural and
political cross-currents—may have shaped the contours of the
decisions. These decisions then served to reshape legal
paradigms that were subsequently applied across the field of
public health law, even when those context-dependent
considerations
were
absent.
In
this
manner,
the
“exceptionalism” of tobacco litigation has significantly
influenced the development of public health law. Each one of
these doctrinal strands discussed above was clearly driven by
other broader forces as well. Cause and effect is virtually
impossible to establish, given the general movement of the
courts towards more conservative positions over the time
supra note 224, at 576-77 (“In fashioning an appropriate measure of deterrence, the
jury must be allowed to consider how many other persons the defendant’s conduct
endangered so that the jury’s interest in deterrence has an objective goal: the cost of
the misconduct should be greater than or equal to the benefit.”).
235
Sara Guardino and Richard Daynard have argued that a defendant’s
“secondary reprehensibility” in obstructing litigation should also be taken into account
when calculating punitive damages. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 27, at 36-38.
236
See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“When the perceived benefits of an activity accrue to the
actor, but some significant part of the costs is borne by others, the cost-benefit analysis
will necessarily be distorted. In such a case, the actor will have an incentive to
undertake activities whose social costs exceed their social benefits. In other words, the
actor will not be adequately deterred from undesirable activities. And society will
suffer.”).
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period examined. Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests
that the centrality of tobacco litigation has itself been a
significant factor influencing doctrinal development.
The remaining question is the normative issue of how
the courts should have addressed tobacco cases—and how they
should do so in the future. Here, there are at least three
options. First, one could conclude that the cases discussed
above were simply wrongly decided and constituted
unwarranted departures from past precedent. In Brown &
Williamson, for example, a strong argument could be made
that Chevron deference called for a more deferential approach
that would have sustained the FDA’s actions. This viewpoint
would suggest that there is no cause to treat tobacco differently
from other products; judges should ignore the uniqueness of the
cultural/social/political context and focus solely on the
application of precedent.
Second, one could argue that the tobacco cases were
correctly decided, but were justified by their unique context
and thus should not be applied and extended in non-tobacco
cases. In this view, the Supreme Court may have been correct
in denying the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products,
but that decision should have been viewed as a one-time
exception to the general rules of administrative deference that
was justified by the unique political and cultural history of
tobacco regulation. This is essentially an argument for tobacco
exceptionalism in the broader sense of the word; a claim that a
unique set of rules should apply to tobacco cases.
The third possible position is that tobacco cases are just
one example of a type of litigation that does not fit well within
the current public health law paradigm. When one industry
has (allegedly) caused harm on a scale so massive that
litigation of all claims would overwhelm the tort system and
destroy the industry in question, the typical rules simply
cannot be applied. Many of the legal developments discussed
above must be seen as having occurred in the shadow of the
“asbestos crisis” which, in the words of the Supreme Court,
constituted an “elephantine mass [that] . . . defies customary
judicial administration and calls for national legislation.”237
Since far more people die from tobacco-related disease every
year than have died from asbestos exposure in the past forty
years, it is no wonder that the courts have looked for ways to
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Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
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keep tobacco cases from overwhelming their dockets.238
Furthermore, beyond the sheer volume of cases, others have
argued that since “tobacco is a product bound up with a series
of overlapping and often conflicting philosophical, economic,
social, political and religious values,” the resolution of such a
complex issue is properly left to the legislative process.239 Thus,
the inability of the courts to coherently address the issue of
tobacco may simply reflect the fact that some issues are simply
too complex for judicial administration.240
While both the size and the complexity of the issue of
tobacco call out for comprehensive legislative action, this
conclusion fails to provide any guidance as to how the courts
should act in the interim. Congress recently passed the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. It remains to be
seen how effective this new Act will be in reducing tobaccorelated death and disease.241 But, as is relevant here, the Act
does not prohibit future litigation and does not give any new
guidance to courts as to how they should address tobaccorelated cases. Since simply rejecting jurisdiction over tobacco
cases is not a viable option, how should the courts address
future tobacco cases?
A full resolution of this difficult question is beyond the
scope of this Article, but is a ripe subject for discussion by legal
scholars, judges, and public health experts. Indeed, the failure
of the courts to address this issue head-on is a major source of
the problem discussed in this Article. Instead of adopting a
clear policy on tobacco cases—that they either will or will not
be treated differently from other public health concerns—the
courts have stumbled towards a third path: they purport to
apply the law in a facially neutral manner, but the unique
exigencies of tobacco litigation inevitably influence the
outcomes. As a result, tobacco cases are permitted to exert an
238

Vinicius C. Antao et al., Asbestosis Mortality in the United States: Facts
and Predictions, 66 J. OCCUP. & ENVTL. MED. 335 (2009) (finding that there were
25,564 asbestosis deaths in the U.S. from 1968 through 2004).
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Turley, supra note 23, at 435.
240
Cf. OREY, supra note 19, at 367 (“[U]sing individual court cases to resolve
such a complex issue—a legal product that causes grievous harm to millions of people’s
health when used as intended—makes no sense.”).
241
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Senate version of the
bill (nearly identical to the final Act) would reduce youth smoking by eleven percent
over the next decade, and would reduce adult smoking by two percent over the same
period. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S.
982, FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 6 (2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10254/s982.pdf.
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outsized and troublesome influence on the rest of public health
law.
Until these questions are resolved, tobacco litigation
will likely continue to produce anomalous outcomes driven by
the unusual pressures of smoking-related cases. Just like the
cigarettes themselves, tobacco-related decisions should come
with a warning label: CAUTION: MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW.

